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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES

FLIES, SPIDERS, TOADS, WOLVES,
AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT’S TAKE PROVISION
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM*
GEORGE KIMBRELL**

The Endangered Species Act’s prohibition against taking listed
species has been the statute’s most controversial provision because it
can impose restrictions on private property. ESA opponents have
mounted repeated attacks against the take provision, claiming that it
exceeds Congress’s constitutional authority under the Commerce
Clause. These attacks have not succeeded: Four federal appellate
decisions have upheld the provision, but they have employed strikingly
different reasoning in doing so. This Article evaluates each of these
decisions and considers whether the Supreme Court would affirm and
on what grounds. The authors predict that the Court would uphold the
ESA’s take provision as having a sufficient commercial nexus under the
Commerce Clause; that is, the statute is a comprehensive economic
regulatory scheme aimed at preserving the economic benefits of
biodiversity and avoiding economically destructive interstate
competition.
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A.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)1 has become the bête noir of
property rights activists, states’ rights enthusiasts, and the neo-conservative
crowd. The Act has been pilloried as inflexible, draconian, and
environmental overkill.2 A poster child for congressional deregulators, the
ESA has become a constant target of legislative reformers.3

1

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000).
For a few examples throughout the last decade, see, e.g., Radanovich to Deliver Keynote
Address to Mid Pacific Water Users Conference, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 22, 2003, 2003 WL 3727146
(draconian); Jonathan Brinckman, Coho Stripped of ‘Threatened’ Status by Judge, OREGONIAN,
Sept. 14, 2001, at B1 (draconian); Eric Brazil, Klamath Basin Farmers Losing Irrigation to Save
Endangered Fish, S. F. CHRON., May 8, 2001, at A3 (draconian); Endangered Species Act, Our
View: Reintroduction of Lynx Shows Why the Law Needs Revision, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan.
4, 1999, at 3A (inflexible); Jonathan Brinckman, Kitzhaber Champions Resource Cooperation,
OREGONIAN, Dec. 5, 1998, at A1 (harsh and inflexible); Rob Taylor, Bulkheads Found to Destroy
Some Vital Marine Habitat; A Salmon Fight on the Beach, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 18,
1999, at A1 (draconian); Tom Kenworthy, Interior Report Says Species Act Works; Law to
Protect Endangered Plants, Animals Is Under Attack on Hill, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1995, at A11
(inflexible and heavy handed); J. Madeleine Nash, The $25 Million Bird: As Endangered
California Condors Return to the Wild, the Law that Saved Them is Under Attack, TIME, Jan. 27,
1992, at 56 (inflexible).
3 Donald J. Barry, Amending the Endangered Species Act, The Ransom of Red Chief, and
2
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But the ESA has remained surprisingly impervious to legislative
amendment. And in truth, the ESA is actually not nearly as inflexible or
draconian as its critics complain. The Clinton Administration made several
administrative changes that made implementation of the statute quite
economically sensitive.4 Moreover, a close study of on-the-ground
implementation would reveal that biological consultation, required of federal
activities adversely affecting listed species,5 is frequently concerned with

Other Related Topics, 21 ENVTL. L. 587, 589–91 (1991) (discussing bills in the 101st Congress).
For a review of some of the ESA reform bills introduced in the 103d and 104th Congresses, see
Douglas L. Huth, Endangered Species Act Reauthorization: Congress Proposes a Rewrite with
Private Landowners in Mind, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 383 (1995) (discussing bills in the 103d Congress);
Nancy Kubasek et al., The Endangered Species Act: Time for a New Approach?, 24 ENVTL. L. 329
(1994) (same); J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering
and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL.
L. 1107, 1153–60 (1995) (discussing bills in the 104th Congress); Eva Tompkins, Reauthorization
of the Endangered Species Act—A Comparison of Two Bills that Seek to Reform the
Endangered Species Act: Senate Bill 768 and House Bill 2275, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 119
(1997) (same). See also Lawrence Michael Bogert, That’s My Story and I’m Stickin’ To It: Is the
“Best Available” Science Any Available Science Under the Endangered Species Act?, 31 IDAHO L.
REV. 85, 140–50 (1994) (discussing why the ESA listing process is prone to error and calling for
statutory reform of the listing process); Larry J. Bradfish, Recent Developments in Listing
Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act and Their Impact on Salmonids in the Northwest,
3 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77, 93–97 (1995) (discussing multiple bills to amend the
ESA in the 103d and 104th Congresses). For a discussion of the most recent attempt to amend
the ESA, see Michael J. Brennan et al., Square Pegs and Round Holes: Application of the “Best
Scientific Data Available” Standard in the Endangered Species Act, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 440–
41 (2003) (discussing bills of the 108th Congress).
4 See, e.g., Fred Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional Mandate for a No Surprises
Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717–19 (1997) (noting the ESA’s mandate for the “No Surprises
Policy” for private landowners and the necessity for such agreements under the Constitution);
Joseph Sax, The Ecosystem Approach: New Departures for Land and Water: Closing Remarks,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883, 884–86 (1997) (discussing the benefits of assurance agreements to private
landowners under the ESA); George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton
Administration, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 40 (1996) (discussing the comprehensive
management plan put in place to protect the northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina)
and other species while balancing economic interests); see Barton H. Thompson, The
Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 316–18
(1997) (noting the availability of incidental take permits for property owners); Karin L. Sheldon,
Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 320–26 (1998) (generally discussing the application of the ESA to private
property); Jon P. Tasso, Habitat Conservation Plans as Recovery Vehicles: Jump-Starting the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 297, 297–318 (1999) (suggesting that
habitat conservation plans could further the ESA’s goal of recovering listed species); Shi-Ling
Hsu, The Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered
Species Act, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,592, 10,596–97 (Oct. 1999) (noting that habitat
plans tend to benefit businesses and private landowners to the detriment of the ESA’s purpose
of recovering species). For a related innovation, the use of “Candidate Conservation
Agreements” as an alternative to listing a species as endangered, see Nancy K. Kubasek et al.,
Cross-Examining Market Approaches to Protecting Endangered Species, 30 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,721, 10,726 (Sept. 2000); Martha Phelps, Candidate Conservation Agreements
Under the Endangered Species Act: Prospects and Perils of an Administrative Experiment, 25
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 175 (1997).
5 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
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balancing economic costs against species protection.6 Nevertheless, the calls
for ESA reform continue unabated.7
The ESA’s critics certainly have not limited their attacks on the statute
to the congressional arena, however. Litigation aimed at disabling various
aspects of ESA implementation has been commonplace as well.8 In the most
celebrated case, advocates of increased timber harvest on public land
challenged the application of the statute’s take provision to habitat
destruction.9 The ESA’s take provision is especially controversial because it
is not limited to restricting the activities of the federal government but
includes limits on private property as well.10 But a divided Supreme Court
surprisingly upheld the challenged regulation in 1995.11 As a result, ESA
critics shifted their focus from challenging the administrative interpretation
of the statute to challenging its constitutionality.
6 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act:
Lessons from the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519, 554–55, 581–82, 598–99 (1999) (giving

examples of and discussing the National Marine Fisheries Service’s willingness to balance cost
concerns against salmon protection).
7 For a discussion of the most recent attempt to amend the ESA, see Brennan et al., supra
note 3, at 440–41 (discussing bills of the 108th Congress). For examples of the general
continuing call for ESA reform, see Joe Rojas-Burke, Coho Story Excites White House,
OREGONIAN, Aug. 13, 2003, at A1; Libby Quaid, Graves: Endangered Species Law Needs
Overhaul, AP NEWSWIRE, July 17, 2003, available at
http://www.citizenreviewonline.org/july_2003/graves.htm; Dan Fagin, A New Environment: Bush
Seeks to Reshape the Laws of Our Land (and Air), NEWSDAY, Jan. 12, 2003, at A4; NATIONAL
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM COALITION, ISSUE ALERT, LEGISLATORS CALL FOR ESA REFORM
AFTER
SILVERY
MINNOW
COURT
DECISION
(June
24,
2003),
available
at
http://www.nesarc.org/minnow.pdf; Press Release, Rep. Greg Walden, (R-Or.), Walden ReIntroduces Legislation to Add Peer Review to Endangered Species Act (Apr. 8, 2003), available
at http://walden.house.gov/press/releases/2003/04Apr/pr0408a03.htm.
8 See, e.g., Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229
(9th Cir. 2001) (challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s incidental take statement, which
prohibited cattle grazing in areas where habitat modification could occur); Alsea Valley Alliance
v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Or. 2001) (challenging final National Marine Fisheries Service
rule listing coho salmon as threatened); N.M. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. United States Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001) (challenging critical habitat designations for the
southwestern willow flycatcher (Emphidonax traillii extimus)); Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (challenging EPA’s imposition of water-use
restrictions as a prohibited taking under the Fifth Amendment); Kandra v. U.S., 145 F. Supp. 2d
1192 (D. Or. 2001) (challenging the suspension of irrigation deliveries, intended to maintain
water levels for threatened and endangered fish species, as a breach contract water rights). For
more on the Klamath conflict, see Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash
of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279 (2003) (discussing the controversial role
of the ESA as a tool for environmental protection and suggesting possible alternatives for
sharing limited water resources in the future).
9 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. (Sweet Home), 515 U.S. 687
(1995); see 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000) (prohibiting the “take” of listed species); 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.3 (2003) (defining “take” to include significant habitat destruction or degradation).
10 Section 9 of the ESA prohibits “any person” from taking listed species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000).
11 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708 (upholding the Secretary of the Interior’s regulatory
definition of “take” to include “significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills
or injures wildlife” as reasonable in light of the ordinary meaning of “harm” and the broad
purpose and intent of the ESA).
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As the Rehnquist Court has narrowed the basis for federal Commerce
Clause regulation,12 the ESA has become vulnerable to constitutional
challenge because the basis for species protection is not exclusively
commercial in nature, but is instead a mixture of philosophy, morality,
aesthetics, and utility.13 Although the statute is widely defended on moral
and aesthetic grounds,14 the utilitarian argument for protecting endangered
species is actually quite strong if understood to include more than just the
commercial, medicinal, or recreational uses of particular species and to
encompass the role of species as indicators of the health of ecosystems
necessary for human health and welfare.15 However, this “canary-in-the-coalmine” function is often subsumed by moral and aesthetic claims for species
protection, making it seem that the ESA fulfills only noncommercial
functions.16 This perception has encouraged ESA opponents to mount
constitutional challenges to the application of the Act’s take provision
against the activities of various private landowners.
In a series of cases, discussed in Section III of this Article, these
opponents alleged that the ESA’s take provision was an unconstitutional
exercise of the Commerce Clause power. Their efforts have yet to bear fruit,
however, as all four appellate decisions—from three different courts of
appeals—rejected their contentions.17 But two of the decisions drew
dissents from well-known “conservative” judges.18 Moreover, the circuits
have been unable to agree as to why the ESA’s take provision is
constitutional, supplying several different rationales.19 Thus, Supreme Court
review of the issue is not out of the question, despite the lack of a circuit
split, particularly in this era in which the Court has revolutionized the
12

See infra Section II.
See, e.g., Zygmunt Z.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species
Act—A Noah Presumption and a Caution Against Putting Gas Masks on the Canaries in the
Coalmine, 27 ENVTL. L. 845 (1997) (discussing the ESA’s protections as fulfilling basic human
13

social interests).
14 See, e.g., STEPHEN R. KELLERT, THE VALUE OF LIFE: BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND HUMAN
SOCIETY 6 (1996) (noting the moralistic, humanistic, naturalistic, and aesthetic justifications for
species protection).
15 See Plater, supra note 13, at 852–54; Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered

Species and What Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect
Them Constitute “Takings”?, 80 IOWA L. REV. 297, 327–28 (1995) (describing endangered species
as “wildlife indicators” and the ESA as a test of Earth pollution levels); John Copeland Nagle,
Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1212–13 (1998) (discussing the “canary-in-the-mine”
rationale for the ESA)).
16 But note that while it did not expressly include the commercial value of species
protection, Congress emphasized a wide variety of ensuing human benefits. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(a)(3) (2000) (expressing congressional determination that endangered “species of fish,
wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value”). Congress also drew a direct connection between species loss and
unrestrained economic growth and commercial development. Id. § 1531(a)(1).
17 See infra Section III.
18 We highlight “conservative” because we think that their conservatism does not extend to
the exercise of judicial power. See, e.g., the colloquy between Judges Wilkinson and Luttig, infra
notes 175–79 and accompanying text, in which Chief Judge Wilkinson accused Judge Luttig of
espousing unwarranted judicial activism.
19 See infra Section III.
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constitutional federal-state balance. Referring to this revolution as a
reinvigoration of “Our Federalism,”20 the Court has struck down federal
legislation for exceeding the Commerce Clause authority for the first time
since the New Deal.21
In this Article, we consider the fate of the ESA’s take provision in this
new judicial era. Section II examines the federalism revolution created by
the Rehnquist Court over the past decade. Section III analyzes the four
circuit court decisions on the constitutionality of the ESA’s take provision.
Section IV then considers the likelihood of the various rationales adopted by
the circuits being accepted by the Rehnquist Court, focusing especially on
the concurrence of Justice Kennedy in United States v. Lopez (Lopez),22 the
case that initiated the Court’s modern federalism revolution.
The Article concludes that the Court would have little difficulty in
upholding the Commerce Clause basis for the ESA where either the
particular species or regulated take has substantial effects on commerce.
20 The term was coined in the modern era first in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)
(Brennan, J.) (noting that the concept represents “a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government . . . always endeavors to [act] in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States”). For further discussion of this concept, see Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) (“Although the Constitution grants broad powers to
Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with
their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation.”);
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587 (1999) (Ginsberg, J.) (stating that “Our
Federalism” means neither complete centralization nor “blind deference” to the rights of States,
but requires “sensitivity to the legitimate interests” of both governments); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (maintaining that the separation of state and federal
governments “is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty”); Camp
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 612 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the “negative Commerce Clause” because it has “no basis in the text of the
Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application”); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[O]ur federalism” allows
the States, as laboratories, “to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from
clear.”); Ankenbrant v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (White, J.) (refusing to extend the
notion of comity, which the court deemed “critical to Younger’s ‘Our Federalism,’” when there
is no pending state proceeding); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 208–09 (1988) (White, J.,
concurring) (arguing that “Our Federalism” means that federal courts should not adjudicate
claims for damages while a state criminal case dealing with the same issue is pending); Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (Powell, J.) (using concept of “our federalism” to aid in the
Court’s interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 500 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the complexities of “our federalism” and the interplay of
state and federal governments when a habeas corpus petition is filed); Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (reflecting on “the
fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and state governments that is essential
to ‘Our Federalism’”); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the converse of Younger should hold true, and “‘Our Federalism’” should not allow
state courts to interfere with the legitimate functioning of federal courts).
21 See infra Section II. The Court had not struck down a federal statute on Commerce
Clause grounds in nearly sixty years, the last time being Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
304 (1936) (holding that Congress lacked Commerce Clause authority to regulate maximum
hours and minimum wages in the coal industry because coal mining and processing were
“production,” not commerce; “production is a purely local activity”).
22 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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However, these justifications would leave many species and some kinds of
take outside the permissible reach of the ESA. A justification that would
uphold the take regulation with respect to all listed species was provided by
both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, which ruled that the commerce necessary
to sustain ESA regulation was in the statute’s comprehensive economic
regulatory scheme. We think that, while the matter is certainly not free from
doubt, the Court would sustain this approach, since Justice Kennedy has
indicated that the purpose or design of a statute can supply the requisite
commerce nexus,23 and regulation of wildlife or endangered species is
certainly not an area traditionally of exclusive state concern.24
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT’S RESURRECTION OF “OUR FEDERALISM”
Until 1995, there was little question that the ESA was constitutional.
The statutory findings stated that “economic growth and development
untempered by adequate concern and conservation” were a primary cause of
species extinctions,25 and the ESA’s legislative history indicated that “the
pressures of trade” threatened fish, wildlife, and plants,26 seeming to place
the Act squarely within Congress’s Commerce Clause power.27 The Supreme
23
24

See infra notes 61–73 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 169–73, 198, 231–33, 280–81, 352, and accompanying text. See also

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999) (explaining that
states share authority to manage wildlife with the federal government).
25 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000).
26 H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 2 (1973), reprinted in COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS,
97TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, AS AMENDED IN
1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, AND 1980, at 149 (Comm. Print 1982).
27 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 2. The ESA could also be sustained under either the Treaty
Clause or the Property Clause powers. Id., art. VI, cl. 2 (Treaty Clause); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2
(Property Clause). Fulfilling international treaty obligations is clearly a purpose of the ESA. See
16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (2000) (listing at least six international treaties related to endangered
species protection); id. § 1531(b) (stating that the purposes of the Act include taking “such steps
as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes” of the treaties mentioned in subsection (a)(4)).
Commentators have disagreed over whether existing treaty obligations would justify the Act’s
take provision. See Gavin R. Villareal, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and
Congressional Authority For the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1125, 1161 (1998) (concluding that the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (Western Convention) justifies the ESA’s habitat
protection); Omar N. White, The Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional
Analysis Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 230–31
(2000) (maintaining that the Western Convention only justifies the ESA’s take provision for
eight species listed both in the annex of the convention and under the ESA). This latter
interpretation of the ESA protections predicated upon the Western Convention stems from
Article VIII of the convention, specifying that only species listed in the treaty’s Annex “shall be
protected as completely as possible, and their hunting, killing, capturing, or taking shall be
allowed only with the permission of the appropriate government authorities.” Convention
Between the United States of America and Other American Republics Respecting Nature
Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Oct. 12, 1940, art. VIII, 56 Stat.
1354, 1366, 161 U.N.T.S. 193, 200 (entered into force April 30, 1940) [hereinafter Western
Convention]; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a) (2000) (authorizing the President to assist foreign
countries to develop conservation plans for endangered species). However, Article V of the
Western Convention, which is not limited to species listed in the Annex, commits the signatory
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Court had not struck down a federal statute as being in excess of the
Commerce Clause since the New Deal,28 sustaining regulation of intrastate
coal mining,29 intrastate credit transactions,30 restaurants using interstate
supplies,31 inns catering to interstate guests,32 and even production of wheat
consumed on-farm.33 In 1981, the Court upheld, against a Commerce Clause
attack, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,34 on the ground
that Congress could rationally conclude that the regulation of private land
strip mining was necessary to control adverse effects on interstate

governments “to adopt . . . suitable laws and regulations for the protection and preservation of
flora and fauna with their natural boundaries . . . [outside] natural parks, national reserves,
nature monuments, or strict wilderness reserves.” Western Convention, supra, art. V, cl. 1, 56
Stat. at 1362–64, 161 U.N.T.S. at 198.
The United States has signed, but has yet to ratify, the Convention on Biological
Diversity, written at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, which would commit the U.S. to
“promote the recovery of threatened species.” Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,
art. 8(f), 31 I.L.M. 818. Both Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
section 312 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States maintain that
prior to the entry into force of a treaty, a country that has consented to it may not take steps
that would defeat its purpose. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336, 25 I.L.M. 556 (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 312(3) (1987).
The Property Clause would serve to justify the ESA take provision for species inhabiting
federal lands and for species whose extinction would harm or threaten to harm public lands.
See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) (using the Property Clause to justify
tearing down fences on private land); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927) (using the
Property Clause to justify prohibiting fires on private lands that endanger national forests); 1
GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 3.14 (rev. ed.
2003) (collecting numerous other lower court cases on the extraterritoriality of the Property
Clause power); Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress is “Without Limitation”: The Property
Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 94–96 (2001) (maintaining
that the reach of the Property Clause power is determined by whether the aggregated effects of
extraterritorial activities are “substantially related to” federal property); see also id. at 122
(suggesting that the Property Clause could justify federal regulation of listed species off federal
property if the species sometimes inhabited federal lands and Congress determined that such
extraterritorial regulation was important to the overall value of federal lands); Holly Doremus,
Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 292
(1991) (asserting that the Court’s reasoning in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976),
upholding the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (1988), on
Property Clause grounds, “could justify federal protection of virtually any biological resource”).
The Property Clause would thus seem to justify federal regulation of many more species than
the Treaty Clause, but it would not support regulation of those species with no connection to
federal public lands. This would appear to be the case with the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly
(Rhaphiomidas terminatus abdominalis), the Texas cave species, and perhaps the southwestern
arroyo toad (Bufo californicus).
28 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
29 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n (Va. Surface Mining), 452 U.S. 264,
268 (1981) (upholding federal reclamation requirements); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 317
(1981) (upholding federal regulations restricting surface or mining prime farmland).
30 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 (1971).
31 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1964).
32 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
33 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
34 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202, 1211, 1231–
1279, 1281, 1291–1309, 1309a, 1309b, 1311–1316, 1321–1328 (2000).
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commerce due to “air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards.”35
Whatever limits there were on Commerce Clause authority seemed
theoretical, mostly because the Court as long ago as 1942 had sanctioned
“aggregation” of economic effects to produce an effect on interstate
commerce, meaning that the cumulative effects of many others similarly
situated may be accumulated to produce an effect on interstate commerce.36
There were even reputable academic suggestions that the Court completely
eschew Commerce Clause review of federal statutes.37
The world changed abruptly in 1995, however, when the Court decided
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA)38 exceeded the
Commerce Clause power.

A. United States v. Lopez: New Limits on the Commerce Clause
Congress enacted and President George H.W. Bush signed the GFSZA in
1990.39 The Act made it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm in a
school zone, which the statute defined as “within a distance of 1,000 feet
from the grounds of a public, parochial, or private school.”40 In 1992, a senior
at a San Antonio, Texas high school brought a concealed .38 caliber handgun
to school and was charged with violating the GFSZA.41 After he was indicted,
he moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the GFSZA violated the
Commerce Clause, but the district court denied his motion, ruling that the
business of education affects interstate commerce.42 The defendant was
subsequently convicted and sentenced to six months in jail and two years
supervised release.43 He appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the
35 Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981) (also citing congressional findings that “many
surface mining operations [burden] and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by
destroying [the] utility of land [by] causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to floods, by
polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats, [and] by impairing [natural
beauty]”).
36 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28 (upholding Commerce Clause regulation of a farmer’s wheat
grown for home consumption, on the ground that this consumption, when considered with the
home wheat consumption of other farmers, was “far from trivial”).
37 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171–259
(1980).
38 Pub. L. No. 101-647, Title XVII, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990).
39 Id. Note, however, that in signing the GFSZA, the first President Bush seemed to invite
litigation with the following statement: “Most egregiously, [the GFSZA] inappropriately
overrides legitimate State firearms law with a new and unnecessary Federal law. The policies
reflected in [the provisions of the Act prohibiting gun possession] could legitimately be adopted
by the States, but they should not be imposed upon the States by Congress.” Statement of
President George Bush Upon Signing S. 3266, Pub. L. No. 101-647, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6696-1 (1990).
40 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (2000).
41 The student was first charged with violating a Texas law prohibiting firearms on school
premises, but those charges were dismissed after he was federally charged. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995). The student actually brought the gun to school to complete a sale. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion never mentioned this fact, although it appeared in the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
42 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
43 Id. at 352.
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conviction and struck down the statute, holding that the GFSZA had
insufficient congressional findings and legislative history to support
Commerce Clause authority.44 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the Fifth Circuit in Lopez, its first decision striking down a federal
statute since the New Deal.45
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for a sharply divided
court, which split five to four.46 He began by announcing “first principles” of
federalism: the Constitution’s granting the federal government powers that
are “few and defined”—in contrast to the authorities of the states which are
“numerous and indefinite”—in order to protect fundamental liberties and
reduce the risk of tyranny.47 Retracing the Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence,48 the Chief Justice identified three broad categories of
regulation authorized by the Commerce Clause: 1) the use of the channels of
interstate commerce, such as using interstate transportation routes; 2) the
protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or
things in interstate commerce, such as proscribing theft of goods destined
for interstate shipment; and 3) intrastate activities having a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.49 The latter category—which Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized required a substantial effect, not just any effect50—
was the focus of judicial attention concerning the GFSZA, as it is with
respect to the take provision of the ESA.
Chief Justice Rehnquist announced that there were four factors to
consider in deciding whether an intrastate activity had a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.51 He found the GFSZA lacking on all counts. First,
the statute’s prohibition of gun possession in school zones had nothing to do
“with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise.”52 The Court went on to
characterize all its previous decisions upholding Commerce Clause
regulation as involving economic activity that substantially affected
44

United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367–68.
See supra note 21.
46 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer dissented in three separate opinions.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 614
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 552.
48 The opinion amounted to a restatement of the Commerce Clause decisions from Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189–90 (1824), to Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 266–70 (1981). See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553–59.
49 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (citing cases, including Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 276–77,
which the Court cited for all three categories).
50 The effect was to make a majority opinion of then Associate Justice Rehnquist’s
concurrences in the surface mining cases, cited supra note 29. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452
U.S. 314, 307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
51 As subsequently paraphrased by the Chief Justice in United States v. Morrison
(Morrison), these factors are: 1) whether the statute regulates commerce or an economic
activity; 2) whether the statute has an express jurisdictional limit restricting its application to
activities with an explicit connection or effect on interstate commerce; 3) whether the statute
contains congressional findings indicating that the activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce; and 4) whether the activity has too attenuated an effect on interstate commerce.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–12 (2000).
52 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)).
45
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interstate commerce.53 However, significantly in terms of the
constitutionality of the ESA’s take provision, the Court did note that federal
regulation of noncommercial activities was constitutionally permissible if
the statute was “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity”
that could be undercut if the intrastate activity was not regulated.54 But
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, without much analysis, that the
prohibition on gun possession was not part of such a comprehensive
scheme.55
Second, the legislative gun prohibition contained no internal
jurisdictional limit guaranteeing an effect on interstate commerce.56 Third,
Congress made no findings demonstrating the link between gun possession
in school zones and effects on interstate commerce.57 Finally, the
government’s litigation argument, which did attempt to make such a link,
was too attenuated, requiring the piling of “inference upon inference” to
produce the requisite effect.58 The Chief Justice suggested that if the Court
were to accept the government’s theory of effect,59 the result would make it
“difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,” destroying the
important distinction between what is “truly national and what is truly
local.”60
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred.61 Because
these two justices supplied the deciding votes to overturn the GFSZA’s ban
of gun possession, the concurrence deserves close scrutiny. Justice Kennedy
began by observing that the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
“counsels great restraint before the Court determines that the Clause is
insufficient to support an exercise of the national power.”62 He noted that
53
54
55

Id. at 559.
Id. at 561.
Id. (“Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in

which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”).
56
57

Id.
Id. at 562. The Court clarified that Congress did not have to make formal findings, but

observed that findings were helpful for judicial evaluation when no substantial effect on
interstate commerce was “visible to the naked eye.” Id. at 562–63.
58 Id. at 564–67.
59 The government argued that the “costs of crime” (e.g., insurance increases and less travel
due to safety concerns) and reduced national productivity (e.g., crime in schools producing an
inadequate educational process and consequently a less productive work force and a poorer
economy) illustrated the requisite adverse effects on interstate commerce. Id. at 564 (internal
quotations omitted). The Court responded that under such reasoning Congress could regulate
any activity related to the economic productivity of individual citizens, including family law
matters such as marriage, divorce, and child custody. Id. at 564, 567.
60 Id. at 564, 568.
61 Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also wrote a concurrence, joined by
no other justice, in which he called for reconsideration of the “substantial effects” aspect of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, suggesting that it was inconsistent with original intent, the
Court’s early Commerce Clause cases, and the notion of a federal government of limited and
defined powers. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“By continuing to apply this rootless and malleable standard [the
“substantial effects” test] . . . the Court has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its
view that the Commerce Clause virtually has no limits.”).
62 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also id. at 577 (“Whatever the

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

320

[Vol. 34:309

the judicial history of the Commerce Clause was “not marked . . . by a
coherent or consistent course of interpretation.”63 From the history he drew
two lessons: 1) “content-based” boundaries (like the manufacturingcommerce dichotomy adopted by the Court in United States v. E.C. Knight
Co.64) alone are insufficient to draw Commerce Clause limits, and 2) stare
decisis should be applied vigorously when the “essential principles” of
congressional power are at issue.65
Despite these caveats, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority
opinion that the GFSZA was beyond the commerce power. He thought that
federalism, “the unique contribution of the Framers to political science and
political theory,”66 could not depend solely upon the political branches of
government, since “momentary political convenience” could undermine the
federal balance which is an “essential . . . part of our constitutional structure
and plays a vital role in securing [individual] freedom.”67 Because he agreed
that neither Lopez nor his gun possession had commercial character, and
since neither the “purposes nor the design” of the GFSZA’s gun prohibition
had a proper “commercial nexus,”68 the statute overreached.
While acknowledging that the interconnectedness of the modern world
gave commercial consequences to almost any conduct, Justice Kennedy
counseled that the Court had not “yet” extended the Commerce Clause that
far.69 Where legislation attempted to reach beyond commercial activity “in
the ordinary and usual sense of the term,” the proper judicial inquiry was to
ask whether the statute intruded upon an area of traditional state control
which, according to Justice Kennedy, was an area to which “States lay claim
by right of history and expertise.”70 This judicial role was justified, he
maintained, because otherwise the states could lose their important roles as
“laboratories for experimentation,” in this case by displacing state authority
with “an invisible federal zone extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often
irregular) boundaries of the school property.”71 This physical preemption
would produce federal encroachment on state judgment, causing the federalstate boundaries to “blur,” making political accountability “illusory.”72 Since
the GFSZA concerned education, an area of traditional state regulation,
Justice Kennedy concluded that the principles of federalism required state

judicial role, it is axiomatic that Congress does have substantial discretion and control over the
federal balance.”).
63
64

Id.

156 U.S. 1 (1895) (finding that the sugar refining cartel, which processed 98% of the sugar
consumed in the country, was not subject to Commerce Clause regulation under the Sherman
Act because it was engaged in “manufacturing,” not “commerce”).
65 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy observed that
“Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption we have a single market
and a unified purpose to build a stable economy.” Id.
66 Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, id. at 559–61).
69 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 581, 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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control, especially absent a strong nexus with the “commercial concerns
that are central to the Commerce Clause.”73

B. United States v. Morrison: Reinforcing the New Commerce Clause Limits
Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 74 in 1994 to
give federal civil remedies to victims of gender-motivated crimes.75 In
September 1994, a female student at Virginia Tech was allegedly raped
repeatedly by two members of that school’s football team.76 The victim filed
a complaint with the university and, after a hearing, the school suspended
Morrison for two semesters for violating the school’s sexual assault policy.77
But the suspension was lifted after an administrative appeal, largely because
the sexual assault policy had not been widely circulated to the student
body.78 The victim then filed suit, alleging that the football players violated
VAWA.79 The defendants argued that VAWA exceeded Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority, and the district court agreed.80 A divided panel of the
Fourth Circuit reversed, but the full Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated
and affirmed the district court’s opinion.81
A divided Supreme Court affirmed the opinion in United States v.
Morrison (Morrison), again splitting five to four. Chief Justice Rehnquist
again wrote the Court’s majority opinion for Justices O’Connor, Scalia,

73 Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest that a
successful challenge to a Commerce Clause-based statutory provision had to meet a two part
test: 1) no strong nexus to commerce; and 2) an invasion into an area of traditional state
concern. As discussed below, the commercial nexus may be established by the commercial
nature of the regulated species, the commercial nature of the activity itself, or the commercial
nature of the regulatory scheme. See infra notes 246–89 and accompanying text.
The commentary on Lopez includes: Stephen M. Johnson, U.S. v. Lopez: A Misstep But
Hardly Epochal For Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33 (1996); Glenn H.
Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of L opez, or What if the Supreme
Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369; and Christine
A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 28–31 (2003).
74 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931–14053 (2000).
75 42 U.S.C. § 13981 states that all persons in the United States have a right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender and gives individual victims of such crimes (defined as
constituting felonies presenting a serious risk of physical injury) the right to compensatory and
punitive damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. § 13981(b)–(d).
76 Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).
77 Id. at 602–03. The school determined that there was insufficient evidence against the
other student-player. Id. at 603.
78 Morrison was subsequently found guilty of the school’s Abusive Conduct Policy for using
abusive language, but the university’s senior vice president and provost set aside the
punishment as excessive in light of other punishments under that policy. Id. at 603.
79 The victim also alleged that Virginia Tech violated Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688, but the district court dismissed this claim. Brzonkala v. Va.
Polytechnic & State Univ. (Brzonkala I ) , 935 F. Supp. 779, 781 (W.D. Va. 1996). The full Fourth
Circuit remanded, indicating that the victim may have a hostile environment claim under Title
IX. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. (Brzonkala II ) , 169 F.3d 820, 827 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
80 Brzonkala I, 935 F. Supp. at 801.
81 Brzonkala II, 169 F.3d at 889, vacating 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Kennedy, and Thomas, the same five-member majority that decided Lopez.
The Chief Justice began by drawing upon Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Lopez to acknowledge that “[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate
branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds.”82 But this presumption of constitutionality did not,
as the Lopez opinion made clear, mean that the commerce power had no
judicially enforceable outer limits; otherwise, it could be used to “obliterate
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government.”83
Focusing again on the “substantial effects” category of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, the Morrison majority found that VAWA suffered from
defects similar to the GFSZA. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that “a fair
reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the
conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case.”84 He emphasized
that “[g]endered-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity.”85 This emphasis on the regulated activity would
have an influence on the subsequent ESA cases.86
Although the Court refused to adopt “a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity,” Chief Justice
Rehnquist claimed that “thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have
upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that
activity is economic in nature.”87 Thus, the government could not defend
VAWA by aggregating the effects of all gender-motivated violence to produce
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.88 According to the Chief Justice,
if the government could aggregate in this context, it would assume a general
82
83
84

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (citing, inter alia, Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577–78 (1995)).
Id. at 608 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–57 (citations omitted)).
Id. at 610. See also id. at 610–11 (citing both the majority opinion in Lopez and Justice

Kennedy’s concurrence numerous times to illustrate the importance of the noneconomic nature
of the conduct to that decision).
85 Id. at 613.
86 See infra notes 145–241 and accompanying text (discussing the red wolf (Canis rufus),
Texas cave species, and arroyo toad cases).
87 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60).
88 The majority also faulted VAWA for lacking a jurisdictional element that would support a
conclusion that the statute was sufficiently linked to interstate commerce. Even though the
statute did contain congressional findings about the substantial effects of gender-motivated
violence on interstate commerce, the congressional findings did not bind the Court. Id. at 613–
14. Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that both the congressional findings and the government’s
arguments in court were too attenuated:
If accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as
the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment,
production, transit, or consumption. Indeed, if Congress may regulate gender-motivated
violence, it would be able to regulate any other type of violence since gender-motivated
violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts than
the larger class of which it is a part.

Id. at 615. See also id. at 615–16 (observing that the government’s argument could justify a
federalization of family law).
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police power police reserved to the states by the Constitution.89 This
apparent restriction on aggregating effects constitutes the greatest threat to
the constitutionality of the ESA’s take provision.

C. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers: Commerce Clause Restrictions as Statutory
Interpretation
The Clean Water Act90 requires a permit for filling “navigable waters,”
which the statute defines as “waters of the United States.”91 The
jurisdictional scope of waters of the United States has always been
controversial,92 even though the statute’s legislative history clearly indicates
that Congress intended to assert jurisdiction over all waterbodies to the
limits of the Commerce Clause.93 The longstanding regulatory definitions
89 Id. at 618 (“Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of
violent crime and vindication of victims.”) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566). For more on Morrison,
see Charles Tiefer, After Morrison, Can Congress Preserve Environmental Laws from
Commerce Clause Challenge?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,888 (Sept. 2000).
The Court also rejected the argument that VAWA should be upheld as an exercise of
congressional remedial power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
specifically invoked in the text of VAWA, because the statute lacked the requisite “congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end,” since it was not specifically directed at any state or state officials. Id. at 625–26
(quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639
(1999)).
90 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).
91 Id. § 1344 (permit requirement); id. § 1362(7) (definition).
92 After the United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected a narrow
interpretation of the scope of the Clean Water Act’s regulatory authority as promulgated by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (ruling that the Clean Water Act’s use of the
term “navigable waters” was “not limited to the traditional tests of navigability”), the Corps
expanded the scope of its regulations, creating a furor in the farming, forestry, and development
communities. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The Clean Water Act’s Section 404 Permit Program
Enters Its Adolescence: An Institution and Programmatic Perspective, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 409, 417–
18 (1980) (describing a Corps press release which suggested federal permit requirements for
farmers and ranchers, twice prompting the House of Representatives to pass bills which would
have restricted the jurisdiction of the 404 program to traditionally navigable waters). See also
William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond, 31
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,741, 10,750–57 (July 2001) (containing a detailed account of the
evolution of the section 404 regulations and congressional responses and concluding that “a
one-quarter century of consistent interpretation, uninterrupted practice, judicial corroboration,
and congressional acquiescence provides . . . evidence of congressional ratification of the
Corps’ and EPA’s interpretation that ‘waters of the United States’ are not restricted by
considerations of navigability or connections to navigable waters”).
93 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131 (1972) (“The Committee fully intends that the term
‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation”); S. CONF. REP.
92-1236, at 144 (1972) (“The conferees fully intend that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the
broadest possible constitutional interpretation.”); S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 75 (1977) (“The 1972
Federal Water Pollution Control Act exercised comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s
waters to control pollution to the fullest constitutional extent.”). Professor Funk’s conclusion
was that the 1972 legislative history, unlike the plain language of the statute or subsequent
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promulgated by the statute’s implementing agencies, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps), asserted jurisdiction over intrastate waters “the use, degradation, or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce.”94 In
addition, under what became known as the migratory bird rule, the Corps
claimed regulatory authority over intrastate waters “[w]hich are or would be
used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties, by other
migratory birds which cross state lines, [or] by endangered species.”95 The
Corps applied the migratory bird rule in determining that the Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County, Illinois (SWANCC) needed a permit to fill
ponds with solid waste on an abandoned sand and gravel pit; the agency
then refused to issue the permit.96 SWANCC filed suit, claiming that the
Corps lacked jurisdiction over the ponds. The district court agreed, but the
Seventh Circuit reversed in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC ) .97 The Supreme Court,
in yet another five to four decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
reversed the Seventh Circuit.
Chief Justice Rehnquist rested his opinion on statutory grounds, ruling
that the term “navigable waters” in the Clean Water Act required that
intrastate, nonnavigable waters like the ponds at issue in SWANCC must
have a significant nexus to waters that are in fact navigable.98 Thus, the
jurisdictional reach of the statute did not extend to those so-called “isolated
waters” covered by the migratory bird rule.99 If it did, the Chief Justice

legislative history, indicated an intent to extend federal jurisdiction only to a broad
interpretation of navigability, not a broad connection with commerce. Funk, supra note 92, at
10,749. However, as mentioned in the preceding note, Funk maintained that Congress later
acquiesced in a broader commerce-based interpretation by EPA, the Corps, and the courts. Id.
at 10,757.
94 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2003) (Corps regulation); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 230.3(s)(3) (2003)
(EPA regulations).
95 The migratory bird rule was not actually codified as a rule. Instead, it appeared in the
preamble to the Corps’ 1986 regulations. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (also asserting jurisdiction over intrastate
waters which are used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce).
96 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC ) , 531 U.S. 159, 164–65 (2001).
97 The Seventh Circuit first vacated and remanded in part the district court’s first decision,
holding that it misapplied the standard for permissive intervention in denying the motion to
intervene of a local citizen group. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1996). On remand, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Corps. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 998 F. Supp. 946, 957 (N.D. Ill. 1998). The Seventh Circuit this time
affirmed. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC I ) , 191 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 1999), rev’d SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
98 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167–68.
99 Other categories of non-navigable, intrastate, isolated waters, such as those used by
interstate travelers for recreation, those from which fish or shellfish are taken and sold in
interstate commerce, and those used for industrial purposes by interstate industries, were not
subject to the Court’s ruling. Professor Funk believes these other categories likely would
survive Commerce Clause scrutiny because each category has an express jurisdictional basis
grounded on a particular class of waterbodies’ effect on interstate commerce. Funk, supra note
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suggested that it would raise “significant constitutional questions,” requiring
the identification of the “precise object or activity” which in the aggregate
substantially affects interstate commerce.100 Yet unlike gun possession in
Lopez or gender-motivated violence in Morrison, there was little question
that the regulated activity—the creation of a municipal landfill—was a
commercial activity.101 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that the
proposed municipal landfill was “‘plainly of a commercial nature,’”102 he
opined that Clean Water Act jurisdiction over isolated waters could impinge
on the “[s]tates’ traditional . . . power over land and water use.”103 This
suggestion that land- and water-use regulation could be an area of traditional
state concern was among the more ominous inferences in the SWANCC
decision.104
Another troublesome aspect of the SWANCC decision was the Court’s
unwillingness to accept the government’s argument that the requisite link to
commerce was satisfied by the proposed municipal landfill, despite the
Court’s acknowledgment that the landfill was “‘plainly of a commercial
nature’,” and the Court’s instruction that the judicial inquiry should be to
“the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce.”105 Part of the problem may have been that the
government’s primary argument in the lower courts was that the requisite
commerce was supplied not by the nature of the regulated activity, but by
the fact that migratory birds used ponds at the landfill site.106 Perhaps
92, at 10,770.
100 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173. However, the Court expressly declined to reach the
constitutional issue. Id. at 162.
101 See id. (describing the government’s argument, which focused on the commercial nature
of filling isolated wetlands to create a municipal landfill). The Seventh Circuit found the
requisite commerce connection in the fact that the public spent over $1 billion in 1996 on
migratory bird hunting and bird-related tourism, and that protection of bird-habitat would
therefore have a direct effect on commerce. SWANCC I, 191 F.3d at 850. The SWANCC dissent
also relied on migratory bird tourism. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also infra note 106. When the government raised instead the argument that regulation of a
municipal landfill was regulation of commerce, the Supreme Court questioned the late nature of
the argument and suggested that this argument was “a far cry, indeed, from the ‘navigable
waters’ or ‘waters of the United States’ to which the statute by its terms extends.” SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 173.
102 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (quoting the Brief of Federal Respondents at 43, SWANCC (No.
99-1178)).
103 Id. at 174.
104 See supra note 73 (describing Justice Kennedy’s formulation, under which a successful
Commerce Clause challenge would have to demonstrate both a lack of commerce nexus and an
invasion of an area of traditional state concern).
105 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
106 Id. The SWANCC dissent also relied in part on the direct commerce effects stemming
from migratory bird tourism and tourism-related activity, noting the conclusions of several
federal agency studies:

In 1984, the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment found that, in 1980, 5.3
million Americans hunted migratory birds, spending $638 million. U.S. Congress, Office
of Technology Assessment, Wetlands: Their Use and Regulation 54 (OTA-O-206, Mar.
1984). More than 100 million Americans spent almost $14.8 billion in 1980 to watch and
photograph fish and wildlife. Ibid. Of 17.7 million birdwatchers, 14.3 million took trips in
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Justice Rehnquist was simply reacting adversely to the change in litigation
tactics. But it is also possible he was suggesting that the commercial nature
of the landfill was too attenuated to provide the commerce necessary to
support Clean Water Act jurisdiction.107 This might mean that the requisite
commercial connection for the ESA take provision is the listed species’
substantial effect on commerce, not the regulated activity’s commercial
nature.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ESA’S TAKE PROVISION
The ESA’s take provision has been controversial since its enactment,
since the ESA’s definition of “take” expanded the definition contained in
earlier wildlife statutes like the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.108 By adding the
term “harm” to the list of proscribed actions,109 the statute authorized the
Department of the Interior to promulgate regulations defining habitat
modification or degradation as “take.”110 This regulation was upheld by the
Supreme Court in a six to three decision in 1995.111 As a result, the focus of
challenges to ESA implementation shifted from whether habitat protection
was authorized by the statute to whether such protection exceeded
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

order to observe, feed, or photograph waterfowl, and 9.5 million took trips specifically to
view other water-associated birds, such as herons like those residing at petitioner’s site.
U.S. Dept. of Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau
of Census, 1996 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated Recreation
45, 90 (issued Nov. 1997).

Id. at 195 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The SWANCC dissenters also cited Judge Wilkinson’s
tourism-related commerce conclusion in Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492–93 (4th Cir. 2000),
discussed infra Section III.B, which relied upon the direct effect of red wolf tourism on
interstate commerce. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 195 (“The relationship between red wolf takings and
interstate commerce is quite direct—with no red wolves, there will be no red wolf related
tourism . . . .” (citing Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492–93)).
107 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (“But [the commercial nature of the landfill] is a far cry, indeed,
from the ‘navigable waters’ and ‘waters of the United States’ to which the statute by its terms
extends.”). For more on SWANCC, see generally Funk, supra note 92; Robin Kundis Craig,
Beyond SWANCC: The New Federalism and Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 33 ENVTL. L. 113
(2003); Klein, supra note 73, at 35–39; Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water
Act After SWANCC: Using a Hydrlogoical Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 811 (2003).
108 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2000). See id. § 703 (Migratory Bird
Treaty’s prohibition on pursu[ing], hunt[ing], tak[ing], captur[ing], [or] kill[ing], migratory birds,
or attempting to do any of the foregoing). The implementing regulations define “take” to mean
to “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt” any of the foregoing.
50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2004).
109 16 U.S.C. § 1532(18) (2000) (including “harass” among the proscribed “takes”).
110 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2004). The regulation was first promulgated in 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412,
44,416 (1975), and revised in 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (1981). On the evolution of the
regulation, see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
LAW 213–14 (3d ed. 1997).
111 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 704–05 (1995) (ruling that specific intent was not a
prerequisite for an activity to produce a proscribed take).
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The Supreme Court’s determination to impose limits on federal
Commerce Clause regulation quickly raised questions about the
constitutionality of the ESA. Many, perhaps most, listed species have no
commercial, recreational, or medicinal value and exist only in one state.
Under the Court’s new version of “Our Federalism,” if these species lacked a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, their regulation under the ESA
would be beyond Commerce Clause authority.
Although all the courts in the cases considered below concluded that
the listed species had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to satisfy
Commerce Clause scrutiny, there was no agreement as to why. Some judges
found the requisite effect in the relationship of the listed species to
interstate commerce; some found it in a generic interrelationship between
all listed species and interstate commerce; some found it in the relationship
of the regulated activity to interstate commerce; some found more than one
reason to uphold the ESA’s take provision. The key issues concerned
whether the effects of the species could be aggregated, so that the
cumulative effects of their loss could be added to produce a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, and the nature of the appropriate class of
activities for aggregation.

A. The Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly and the Biodiversity Defense
The first appellate case to consider the constitutionality of the ESA’s
take provision involved the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly (Raphiomidas
terminatus abdominalis), an intrastate species known to exist only within an
eight-mile radius in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, California, and
one of only a few species that pollinate native plant species of the region.112
The fly is not bought or sold in interstate commerce; tourists do not seek it
out; it has no current medical value; it is a quintessential noncommercial
species. However, as a pollinator, the fly is part of a class of species that
provides essential agricultural services: The value of all insect-pollinated
plants in the United States was estimated at more than $19 billion in the late
1980s.113 After the fly lost over 97% of its historic habitat due to urban
development, unauthorized trash dumping, and off-road vehicle use, and
after receiving two citizen petitions,114 the Secretary of Interior listed the
species as endangered in 1993.115 It was the first time a species of fly was
listed under the ESA.116

112

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (NAHB ) , 130 F.3d 1041, 1043–44 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89
IOWA L. REV. 495, 547 (2004) (citing DONALD JOYCE BORROR ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF INSECTS (1989)).
114 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2000) (citizen petitions for listings). The citizen petition
process for listings is an overlooked aspect of the ESA. See Blumm & Corbin, supra note 6, at
586–87 (noting that most listings under the ESA were the result of citizen petitions).
115 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Determination of Endangered Status for
the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,881, 49,885 (1993).
116 See John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving
Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 174 (1998) (noting that there are some 80,000 fly species).
113
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The listing disrupted the plans of San Bernardino County to build a
hospital, since the proposed hospital site included fly habitat. As a result, the
county modified its plans to eliminate effects on fly habitat (and also
eliminate the need for an ESA permit), creating an eight-acre preserve of fly
habitat and a 100-foot corridor allowing interbreeding between two fly
populations.117 Subsequently, the county obtained an ESA permit to
construct a power plant for the hospital on four acres of fly habitat by
acquiring and preserving an additional 7.5 acres of habitat.118 However, when
the county sought to redesign an intersection to improve emergency vehicle
access to the hospital, the Interior Department notified the county that it
would need another ESA permit. Rather than seek another permit, the
county, joined by two building groups and two nearby cities, filed suit,
claiming that the ESA’s take prohibition, as applied to the fly, was
unconstitutional.119 The district court rejected the challenge, concluding that
the federal government had the constitutional authority to regulate wildlife
and nonfederal lands that supply habitat for endangered species.120 A
fractured D.C. Circuit affirmed, Judge Wald writing an opinion in which
Judge Henderson joined in part, while Judge Sentelle dissented.121
Judge Wald thought the take provision was constitutional on two
different grounds: 1) it was proper congressional control over the channels
of interstate commerce, both because it regulated the interstate transport of
listed species and because it kept the interstate channels free from immoral
and injurious uses;122 and 2) it substantially affected interstate commerce by
preventing injurious destructive interstate competition123 and protecting
117
118

See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1044.
See id. at 1044–45.

119 The county was joined by the Building Industry Legal Defense Fund, the California
Building Industry Association, and the cities of Colton and Fontana. See id. at 1045.
120 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of the United States v. Babbitt, 949 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C.
1996), aff’d, NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
121 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1043 (Wald, J.); id. at 1057 (Henderson, J., concurring); id. at 1060
(Sentelle, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 1046 (Wald, J.). Judge Wald analogized the take prohibition to the prohibition of
machine gun possession, 18 U.S.C. § 822(o) (2000), upheld by four circuits as a proper
regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. Id. at 1047. Like the effective regulation of
machine gun trafficking, which requires regulation of intrastate possession, she concluded that
“one of the most effective ways to prevent traffic in endangered species is to secure the habitat
of the species from predatory invasion and destruction.” Id. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 105
F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that in order to regulate the interstate trade in
machine guns, it was necessary to regulate the possession of them). Judge Wald also upheld the
take prohibition because it prevented the channels of interstate commerce from being used for
immoral or injurious purposes. Id. at 1048 (relying principally on Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256, 258 (1964), which upheld a prohibition on racial discrimination
in public accommodations serving interstate travelers, and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
114 (1941), which upheld federal wage and hour regulations on the ground that Congress may
“exclude from commerce goods that will have injurious effects”).
123 Judge Wald reasoned that the ESA’s regulation of fly taking would prevent injurious
interstate competition, drawing a parallel to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
the constitutionality of which the Supreme Court sustained on the ground that the regulation of
intrastate surface mining was “necessary to protect interstate commerce from the adverse
effects that may result from that activity.” Id. at 1055 (citing Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264,
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biodiversity.124 She observed that there was little question that Congress, in
enacting the ESA, was quite concerned with preserving the commercial
value of species diversity.125 Judge Henderson joined in the biodiversity
rationale, but neither Judge Henderson nor any other judge considering the
ESA’s constitutionality agreed with Judge Wald that the ESA was justified as
a proper regulation of the channels of interstate commerce.126
Judge Wald and Judge Henderson agreed that the take regulation
substantially affected interstate commerce by protecting biodiversity,
although they did not agree as to why. Assuming the applicability of
aggregation, Judge Wald made no attempt to ascertain the fly’s effect on
interstate commerce and focused instead on the effect of all listed species
on interstate commerce. She noted that endangered plants and animals are
and could be valuable sources of medicine and genetic material, the loss of
which could have substantial commercial consequences.127 While she
281 (1981), a case in which the Supreme Court also noted, at 452 U.S. at 282, that “the power
conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to permit congressional regulations of
activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in
more than one state”). This “destructive competition” rationale was not endorsed by either of
the other two judges of the panel, but it was later found persuasive by the Fourth Circuit and
another panel of the D.C. Circuit. See infra notes 172, 234, and accompanying text.
124 Id. at 1052. Judge Wald defined biodiversity as “the presence of a large number of species
of animals and plants.” Id.
125 Id. at 1050–51 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 4–5 (1973) and S. REP. NO. 91-526, at 3
(1969)). Congress expressly determined that endangered species have aesthetic, educational,
and recreational value. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (2000). The House Report cited by Judge Wald
specifically stressed the preservation of listed species to assure the “continuing availability of a
wide variety of species to interstate commerce” and expressed concern that “[a]s we
homogenize the habitats in which these plants and animals evolved . . . we threaten their—and
our own—genetic heritage.” NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1050–51. Because the value of diversity is
“incalculable . . . it is in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic
variations . . . [for] they are potential resources.” Id. at 1051. The 1969 Senate Report cited by
the court focused on preserving listed species to “permit the regeneration of [particular] species
to a level where controlled exploitation of that species can be resumed” because “with each
species we eliminate, we reduce the [genetic] pool . . . which may subsequently prove invaluable
to mankind in improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease or environmental
contaminants.” Id. at 1051. Note that the 1969 Senate Report is relevant because the 1973 Senate
Report on the ESA was based on the reasoning of the 1969 Senate Report on the Endangered
Species Conservation Act of 1969, which was its predecessor.
126 Judge Henderson rejected Judge Wald’s “channels” rationale because the fly was not
transported in interstate commerce. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring) (“[The
desert-loving flies] are . . . entirely intrastate creatures. They do not move among states either
on their own or through human agency. As a result, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act in
Lopez, the statutory protection of the flies ‘is not a regulation of the use of the channels of
interstate commerce.’” (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)). See also id. at 1063 (Sentelle,
J., dissenting) (agreeing with Judge Henderson’s rejection of the channels of commerce
rationale).
127 For example, Judge Wald observed that 50% of the most frequently prescribed medicines
are derived from wild plant and animal species; those medicines had a 1983 value in excess of
$15 billion a year. Id. at 1052–53. See also id. at 1052–54 (noting that species with unknown
value may have future economic value as a result of scientific discoveries, so-called “option
value”). Judge Wald also noted that plant genetic resources contributed to the “explosive
growth in farm production” during the twentieth century. Id. at 1053. The option value, or
economic value of biodiversity, was estimated between $16 and $54 trillion per year, with an
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acknowledged that it is impossible to know precisely what effect the loss of
a particular species might have on interstate commerce, she maintained that
“the extinction of species and the attendant decline in biodiversity will have
a real and predictable effect on interstate commerce.”128 Judge Wald also
observed that the Ninth Circuit upheld the Bald Eagle Protection Act129 as a
valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority on similar grounds: since
“[e]xtinction of the eagle would substantially affect interstate commerce by
foreclosing any possibility of several types of commercial activity.”130
Although Judge Henderson concurred with Judge Wald that the loss of
biodiversity has a substantial effect on ecosystems, she did not agree that
potential future medicinal or economic effects of biodiversity loss justified
Commerce Clause regulation, finding these potential effects to be too
uncertain.131 Nevertheless, she agreed that the loss of biodiversity due to the
taking of listed species had a substantial effect on interstate commerce
because, due to the interconnectedness of species and ecosystems, “it is
reasonable to conclude that the extinction of one species affects others and
their ecosystems and that the protection of a purely intrastate species (like
the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly) will therefore substantially affect land
and objects that are involved in interstate commerce.”132 The
interconnectedness that Judge Henderson found persuasive holds that the
whole is greater than the sum of its parts; that it is the number of species,
not their individual characteristics, that is valuable. Biodiversity requires
large numbers of species, and large numbers will improve the chances that a
particular species will provide great human benefits, like medicinal cures or
nutritional advances.133 This judicial concern for protecting biodiversity has

average value of $33 trillion (or roughly double the annual global national product), in a 1997
study. KERRY TEN KATE & SARAH A. LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIVERSITY: ACCESS TO
GENETIC RESOURCES AND BENEFIT SHARING 3 (1999).
128 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053–54. Judge Wald complained that while both Judges Henderson
and Sentelle cited her acknowledgment of the imprecise nature of the exact effect of a loss of a
species, both ignored her argument that “a decline in biodiversity will have a ‘real and
predictable’ effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 1053 n.14 (emphasis in original). Judge Wald
added that because “biodiversity has a real, substantial, and predictable effect on both the
current and future interstate commerce, ‘the de minimis character of individual instances
arising under [the ESA] is of no consequence.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 558). Here, Judge Wald was anticipating the comprehensive plan defense that would be
more fully articulated by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. See infra notes 163–68, 197–203, and
accompanying text.
129 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668d (2000).
130 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1054 (quoting United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir.
1996)). Similarly, a district court upheld the constitutionality of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3371–3378 (2000), which makes it a federal offense to transport species acquired in violation
of state or foreign law, as within the federal commerce power. United States v. Romano, 929 F.
Supp. 502, 507–09 (D. Mass. 1996).
131 Id. at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring).
133 See Nagle, supra note 116, at 188–89 & n.59 (noting that the flower-loving fly might have
significance to foods that are pollinated, such as “cashews, squash, mangos, cardamom, cacao,
cranberries, and highbush blueberries”).
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solid grounding in science,134 and the willingness to defer to reasonable
congressional determinations135 reflects judicial restraint.
In addition to embracing the biodiversity defense, Judge Henderson
also concluded that the nature of the particular take that the county
proposed—commercial land development with “a plain and substantial
effect on interstate commerce”—made the application of the take regulation
to the rerouted intersection a lawful exercise of Commerce Clause
authority.136 This focus on the commercial nature of the regulated activity
was materially different from the focus on the effects of the loss of the fly on
interstate commerce, raising questions about where the proper focus for
Commerce Clause analysis should be.137 Since Judge Henderson’s alternative
ruling on the commercial nature of the hospital road was not joined by Judge
Wald, the majority decision was based on the biodiversity defense. But an
ensuing panel of the D.C. Circuit would find the focus on the commercial
nature of proposed land development to be persuasive.138
Judge Sentelle dissented, concluding that the take prohibition was
unconstitutional because the fly was neither “interstate nor commerce” nor
within the Lopez decision’s taxonomy.139 Judge Sentelle objected to the
majority’s biodiversity rationale for failing all of the Lopez tests: The
regulated activity was not commercial; the statute contained no
jurisdictional limit; and the reasoning had no logical stopping point.140 He

134 See id. (relying, inter alia, on Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a
Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L.

1095, 1129 (1996)). As E.O. Wilson noted:
The traditional econometric approach, weighing market price and tourist dollars, will
always underestimate the true value of wild species. None has been totally assayed for
all of the commercial profit, scientific knowledge, and aesthetic pleasure it can yield.
Furthermore, none exists in the wild all by itself. Every species is part of an ecosystem,
an expert specialist of its kind, tested relentlessly as it spreads its influence through the
food web. To remove it is to entrain changes in other species, raising the population of
some, reducing or even extinguishing others, risking a downward spiral of the larger
assemblage.
EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 308 (1992).
135 See supra note 16 (congressional findings).
136 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059–60 (Henderson, J. concurring).
137 See Nagle, supra note 116, at 208 (arguing that either focus should be available to provide
the requisite connection to interstate commerce).
138 See infra notes 212–25 and accompanying text (discussing the southwestern arroyo toad
decision).
139 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1067 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“In the end, attempts to regulate the
killing of a fly under the Commerce Clause fail because there is certainly no interstate
commerce in the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly.”).
140 Id. at 1064–65 (Sentelle, J. dissenting). On the first factor—the commercial nature of the
regulated activity—Judge Sentelle stated, “Neither killing flies nor controlling weeds nor
digging holes is either inherently or fundamentally commercial in any sense. . . . The activity
regulated in the present case involves local land use, a . . . traditional stronghold of state
authority.” Id. at 1064. He made no mention of the commercial nature of the hospital or the
traffic intersection. The last factor—no logical stopping point—was the dissent’s repeated
refrain throughout his disagreement with both Judge Wald and Judge Henderson. Id. at 1064–67
(Sentelle, J. dissenting).
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emphasized that the Framers authorized Congress to regulate commerce,
not ecosystems, and “[a]n ecosystem is an ecosystem, and commerce is
commerce.”141
Judge Sentelle also rejected Judge Henderson’s alternative rationale
that emphasized the commercial nature of the hospital and road.142 He
thought that this focus on the regulated activity was inconsistent with Lopez
because it lacked a stopping point and would allow the regulation of
noncommercial activities where the regulation substantially affects
interstate commerce.143 Instead of focusing on the regulated activity, he
insisted that the proper focus was on whether the fly had substantial effects
on interstate commerce, and he concluded it had none.144

B. The Commercial Effects of Red Wolves and the Importance of a
Comprehensive Scheme
The second appellate decision to consider the constitutionality of the
ESA’s take provision involved a species with much closer connections to
commerce than the flower-loving fly: the red wolf (Canis rufus). Red wolves
were once common throughout the southeastern United States, especially in
riverine habitats where they preyed on marsh rabbits (Sylvialagus
palustris).145 But due largely to the drainage of swamps and wetlands for
agricultural production and the success of predator control efforts, the red
wolf was listed as endangered in 1967.146 Because of their perilously low
numbers, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) began trapping red wolves for
a captive breeding program in the mid-1970s, with the idea that they would
eventually be reintroduced into the wild.147 In the late 1980s, the Service
began reintroducing red wolves into Alligator National Wildlife Refuge in
eastern North Carolina, and later expanded to the Pocosin Lakes National
Wildlife Refuge in Tennessee in the early 1990s.148 The red wolves would not

141
142

Id. at 1065 (Sentelle, J. dissenting).
See also supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. Judge Sentelle also rejected Judge

Wald’s “channels” rationale, since the fly did not travel in interstate commerce, nor was it
connected to persons or things that did, nor, he maintained, did preventing destruction of its
habitat contribute to the suppression of an injurious use. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1063 (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Judge Wald’s position on the “channels” issue was not a majority
position). In addition, he thought that Judge Wald’s “destructive competition” rationale was
improperly applied to the fly habitat, since it did not involve commercial activity. Id. at 1066
(Sentelle, J. dissenting).
143 Id. at 1067 (Sentelle, J. dissenting).
144 Id. at 1066–67 (Sentelle, J. dissenting).
145 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Experimental
Population Status for an Introduced Population of Red Wolves in North Carolina, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,790, 41,791 (1986).
146 Native Fish and Wildlife: Endangered Species, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (1967).
147 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Experimental
Population Status for an Introduced Population of Red Wolves in North Carolina, 51 Fed. Reg.
at 41,791.
148 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 2000).

2004]

FLIES, SPIDERS, TOADS, AND WOLVES

333

stay on federal lands, however, and by 1998 over half of the population of
approximately 75 wolves had migrated onto private lands.149
The wolves were not popular with local landowners, who saw them as
threats to their livestock. But an FWS regulation prohibited the take of red
wolves unless in defense of human life or when wolves are in the act of
killing pets or livestock.150 In 1990, a landowner shot a red wolf he thought
was threatening his cattle. The federal government prosecuted the
landowner, who pleaded guilty. The prosecution triggered local opposition
to the red wolf program, and the North Carolina legislature responded by
passing a statute allowing trapping and killing of red wolves by landowners
in four eastern counties.151 This state statute was in facial conflict with the
ESA wolf regulation, although no actual conflicts ensued, since there were
apparently no prosecutions after the enactment of the statute.
Nevertheless, a group of plaintiffs, including the landowner who had
been prosecuted earlier,152 filed suit against the red wolf take regulation,
claiming that it exceeded the federal Commerce Clause power. The district
court rejected the claim, determining that the regulation was permissible
because red wolves “are things in interstate commerce,” they move across
state lines, are followed by tourists, academics, and scientists, and the
tourism they produce substantially affects interstate commerce.153 A divided
Fourth Circuit affirmed in Gibbs v. Babbitt (Gibbs), a case significant for
being the first appellate court decision on the constitutionality of the ESA’s
take provision in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Morrison opinion.
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Wilkinson acknowledged that
Lopez and Morrison recognized that the Commerce Clause power has
judicially enforceable limits, but he cautioned that courts “may not simply
tear through the considered judgments of Congress” and may invalidate a
federal statute “only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds.”154 Like the D.C. Circuit in the flower-loving fly case,
he focused on the third prong of Commerce Clause analysis identified by the

149
150

Id. (noting that approximately 41 of 75 wolves resided on private lands).

Because the wolves were reintroduced into the wild, they were considered to be
“experimental populations” under section 10(j) of the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (2000). This
designation provides for relaxed take standards, allowing take in defense of lives or livestock
and pets (provided that freshly wounded or killed pets or livestock are evident). Id. The Fish
and Wildlife Service has abandoned efforts to capture the wolves in question and approves
private takes in writing, requiring such takes to be reported to the Service within 24 hours. 50
C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (2004) (also allowing landowners to harass wolves by methods that are not
lethal or physically injurious).
151 See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
152 Richard Mann, the landowner who was federally prosecuted, was joined by Charles Gibbs
and two North Carolina counties. Id. at 490.
153 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
154 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 490 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000)). Judge Wilkinson
quoted from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lopez that “[t]he substantial element of political
judgment in Commerce Clause matters leaves our institutional capacity more in doubt than
when we decide cases, for instance, under the Bill of Rights.” Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
579 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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Lopez opinion—whether the regulated activity, alone or in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.155
Schooled by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Morrison,156 Judge
Wilkinson emphasized the importance of the commercial character of the
regulated activity, but he also noted that “under the Commerce Clause,
economic activity must be understood in broad terms.”157 With this principle
in mind, he determined that a take of a red wolf on private land is economic
activity because:
The relationship between red wolf takings and interstate commerce is quite
direct—with no red wolves, there will be no red wolf related tourism, no
scientific research, and no commercial trade in pelts. . . . While a beleaguered
species may not presently have the economic impact of a large commercial
enterprise, its eradication nonetheless would have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. And through preservation the impact of an endangered
species on commerce will only increase.158

The court also observed that landowners, who consider the red wolf a
menace, take them in an effort to protect livestock of commercial value and
claim that restrictions on such take adversely affect interstate commerce.
Judge Wilkinson found this also to be a sufficient basis for Commerce
Clause regulation, since Congress may choose to promote or to restrict
commercial enterprises.159
Because the take of wolves was economic activity, the majority ruled
that individual takings could be aggregated for Commerce Clause analysis,
“especially . . . where, as here, the regulation is but one part of the broader
scheme of endangered species legislation.”160 Thus, the court considered the
155 Id. at 491–92. The court determined that the wolf take regulation would not satisfy the
first part of the Lopez Commerce Clause analysis because it did not target the use of the
channels of interstate commerce, nor attempt to prohibit the interstate transport of a
commodity through those channels. Id. at 490. Judge Wilkinson identified the following as
included in the term “channel of interstate commerce”: navigable waters; interstate railroads,
highways, and telephone and telegraph lines; air traffic routes; and television and radio
broadcast frequencies. Id. at 490–91 (citing United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir.
1997)). The court ruled that the wolf take regulation also did not implicate the second element
of the Lopez test, since red wolves were not “things” in interstate commerce, even though
wolves had been transported interstate for the purposes of study and reintroduction programs.
Id. at 491.
156 Id. at 491 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 n.4, for the proposition that in all previous
cases using the aggregation principle “the regulated activity was of apparent commercial
character”).
157 Id. at 490. See also id. at 491 (cautioning against “a cramped view of commerce [that]
would cripple a foremost federal power and in so doing would eviscerate national authority”).
158 Id. at 492–93.
159 Id. at 495. Judge Wilkinson interpreted Lopez and Morrison to instruct courts to rule that
a federal statute exceeds the Commerce Clause when it “has only a tenuous connection to
commerce and infringes on areas of traditional state concern.” Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
Apparently Judge Wilkinson sanctioned this two-part test for striking down a statute for
exceeding the bounds of the commerce power. See also supra notes 68 & 73, infra notes 271–72,
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy’s two-part test in his Lopez concurrence).
160 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493.
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take regulation’s connection to the estimated economic value of wolf
recovery in terms of tourism, scientific research, and the possibility of a
renewed trade in wolf pelts.161 It also concluded that wolf preservation could
produce economic benefits through wolf predation on agricultural pests by
helping to create a healthier ecosystem.162
In addition to its conclusions about the commercial nature of wolf take,
the Gibbs majority upheld the red wolf take regulation on the ground that it
was “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.”163 Judge Wilkinson quoted the Supreme Court to the effect that,
“‘[a] complex regulatory program . . . can survive a Commerce Clause
challenge without a showing that every single facet of the program is
independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal.’”164 The red
wolf regulation was sustainable because it was part of the ESA, a regulatory
scheme with clear connections to commerce,165 and could not be viewed
only from the taking of one wolf “but from the potential commercial
differential between an extinct and a recovered species.”166 Otherwise, the
result could be that the fewer the members of a species, the less the federal
authority to prevent its extinction, a result Judge Wilkinson termed
“perverse” because it would “eviscerate the comprehensive federal scheme
161

Id. at 493–95. The court explained that:

The full payoff of conservation in the form of tourism, research, and trade may not be
foreseeable. Yet it is reasonable for Congress to decide that conservation of species will
one day produce a substantial commercial benefit to this country and that failure to
preserve a species will result in permanent, though unascertainable commercial loss.

Id. at 496. Supreme Court authority exists for the proposition that Congress can regulate
potential future markets. See Presault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1990)
(holding that Congress could authorize maintenance of abandoned railroads even if there was
no foreseeable future use). Judge Wilkinson’s partial reliance in Gibbs on a renewed trade in
wolf pelts, although criticized by the dissent, is also consistent with the legislative history of the
ESA: “The protection of an endangered species of wildlife with some commercial value may
permit the regeneration of that species to a level where controlled exploitation of that species
can be resumed.” S. REP. NO. 91-526, at 3 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1415.
162 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495–96. Here, Judge Wilkinson included a plea for judicial restraint:
It is within the power of Congress to regulate the coexistence of commercial activity and
endangered wildlife in our nation and to manage the interdependence of endangered
animals and plants in large ecosystems. It is irrelevant whether judges agree or disagree
with congressional judgments in this contentious area. . . . Congress could find that
conservation of endangered species and economic growth are mutually reinforcing. It is
simply not beyond the power of Congress to conclude that a healthy environment
actually boosts industry by allowing commercial development of our natural resources.

Id. at 496.
163 Id. at 497 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
164 Id. (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981)); see also id. (“‘It is enough
that the challenged provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and that the
regulatory scheme as a whole satisfies this test.’”) (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 329
n.17).
165 The majority concluded that “[o]f course, natural resource conservation is economic and
commercial.” Id. at 506.
166 Id. at 497.
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for conserving endangered species and turn congressional judgment on its
head.”167 This comprehensive scheme rationale, which moves the focus away
from the commercial nature of the species and the regulated activity and to
the statutory scheme, would be adopted by the Fifth Circuit in the Texas
cave species case.168
The majority acknowledged that Lopez and Morrison require “a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local” but
rejected the appellants’ contention that the ESA wolf regulation infringed on
traditional state control of wildlife.169 The court observed that state wildlife
authority has long been shared with the federal government and
circumscribed by it.170 Citing a lengthy history of federal wildlife regulation,
the court concluded that “endangered wildlife regulation has not been an
exclusive or primary state function.”171 Further, the Fourth Circuit ruled that
ESA regulation was sustainable as a federal effort to prevent destructive
interstate competition from producing a “race to the bottom” that would
damage national environmental quality.172 Thus, unlike the statutes at issue
in Lopez and Morrison, the ESA regulation was within the traditional federal
sphere: A ruling to the contrary would not “preserv[e] traditional state roles
[but would instead] dismantl[e] historical federal ones.”173 Moreover, the
ESA regulation had a natural stopping point—only regulation of listed
species was authorized—so there was no danger of the ESA being used as a
general police power.174
In response to Judge Luttig’s dissent, the majority cautioned against
judicial activism that “would rework the relationship between the judiciary
and its coordinate branches.”175 The majority chided Judge Luttig’s apparent
disapproval of the substance of the red wolf regulation and accused him of
seeking to reverse the traditional presumption in favor of an enactment’s
constitutionality, suggesting that he would impose a burden on those
defending the constitutionality of legislation.176 This result would, according
to the Fourth Circuit, unwisely thrust courts “into the thick of political

167
168

Id. at 498.
See infra notes 197–203 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s

“comprehensive scheme” rationale).
169 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000)).
170 Id. (relying on Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204–05
(1999), and Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326, 329 (1979)).
171 Id. at 500. The court cited the 1900 Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 701 (1994), the 1918 Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (1994), the 1940 Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
668–668d (1994), the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1421h (1994 &
Supp. III 1997), and the 1976 Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1801–1883 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), as well as several Supreme Court and circuit court decisions
upholding these statutes. Id. at 500–01.
172 Id. at 501–02 (citing Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 281–82 (1981)). Thus, the Fourth
Circuit echoed, without citing, the concerns of Judge Wald in the flower-loving fly case. See
supra note 123.
173 Id. at 504.
174
175
176

Id.
Id.
Id. at 504–05.
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controversy.”177 The court rejected the dissent’s contention that Lopez and
Morrison called for transforming the traditional judicial protection of state
activities “into a sword dismembering a long recognized federal [activity].”178
Judge Wilkinson concluded, “It is as threatening to federalism for courts to
erode the historic national role over scarce resource conservation as it is for
Congress to usurp traditional state prerogatives in such areas as education
and domestic relations.”179
Judge Luttig’s spirited dissent took issue with the majority’s wolfcommerce conclusions, referring to the inferences and speculation
necessary to reach them as “exponentially”180 greater than what would be
needed to find a commerce connection in Lopez and Morrison.181 He thought
that the killing of red wolves on private property did not constitute
economic activity, and therefore could not be aggregated for the purpose of
finding a substantial effect on commerce.182 Judge Luttig accused the
majority of adopting the approach of the dissents in Lopez and Morrison and
unwisely deferring to the political branches to safeguard states against
federal encroachment.183

C. The Texas Cave Species and the Comprehensive Scheme
Principle (Again)
Whereas the red wolf case involved a species with evident effects on
interstate commerce, six tiny subterranean invertebrate arachnids and
insects, located only in caves in two Texas counties near Austin, had a much
more tenuous link to commerce. Nevertheless, these rather anonymous
species were listed under the ESA and combined to block a landowner’s
plans to develop a Wal-Mart shopping center, a residential subdivision, and

177
178
179

Id. at 505.
Id.
Id. See also id. at 506 (“If we were to decide that this regulation lacked a substantial

effect on commerce and therefore was invalid, we would open the door to standardless judicial
rejection of democratic initiatives of all sorts.”).
180 Id. at 506–10 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 507–08 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s conclusions about tourism,
scientific research, the possible resurrection of interstate trade in wolf pelts, and the beneficial
commercial effects of wolf protection). Judge Luttig was the author of the Fourth Circuit
opinion that the Supreme Court sustained in Morrison. See Brzonkala II, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999) (en banc), aff’d, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). His dissent in Gibbs attempts to discredit
the economic studies of wolves because they were not published. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507 (Luttig,
J., dissenting). This critique, however, overlooks the fact that it is not the academic prestige
attached to the science, but the mere fact that the research was undertaken at all, since
business and employment was generated by the scientific inquiry, which is the basis for
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.
182 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting). In this respect, Judge Luttig’s conclusion
was similar to Judge Sentelle’s in the flower-loving fly case. See supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
183 Id. at 509 (Lutting, J., dissenting) (“Morrison has left no doubt . . . that the interpretation
of the [Commerce Clause] of the Constitution, no less than any other, must ultimately rest not
with the political branches, but with the judiciary.”).
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office buildings.184 When FWS denied the landowner an incidental take
permit for the development,185 the landowner sued, alleging that the ESA’s
take provision, as applied to the Texas cave species, was in excess of the
Commerce Clause power.186 The district court rejected this claim, ruling that
the take provision was constitutional under the Commerce Clause because
the proposed development had a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
as the court was “hard-pressed to find a more direct link to commerce than a
Wal-Mart.”187
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court’s reasoning but unanimously
affirmed the result. After observing that one of the “first principles” of
constitutional law is the notion that the federal government is one of limited
powers,188 Judge Barksdale noted that in Morrison—where the Supreme
Court defined the outer limits of the Commerce Clause power—the Court
identified several considerations for determining whether an intrastate
activity had substantial effects on interstate commerce, primarily whether
the regulated activity was economic or commercial in nature.189 But, drawing
184 GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton (GDF Realty), 326 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 2003). The four
arachnids (arthropods with four pairs of legs and no antennae) are the Bee Creek Cave
harvestman (Texella reddelli ) , the Bone Cave harvestman (Texella reyesi ) , the Tooth Cave
pseudoscorpian (Tartarocreagris texana)—all eyeless, ranging from 1.4 to four millimeters—
and the Tooth Cave spider (Neoleptoneta myopica), which has eyes and measures 1.6
millimeters. The two insects are the Tooth Cave ground beetle (Rhadine persephone) and the
eyeless Kretschmarr Cave mold beetle (Texamaurops reddelli ) , varying in size from three to
eight millimeters. Id. at 624. The Fish and Wildlife Service listed five of the species in 1988 and a
sixth in 1993, due largely to habitat loss from land development activities. Id. at 625.
185 The permit denial came only after the landowner had deeded 6 of its 216 acres, containing
caves and sinkholes, to a nonprofit environmental group, in order to alleviate concerns about
the effects of its development plans on the cave species, but the Fish and Wildlife Service would
not state that the development would not take the listed species and later informed the
landowner that brush clearing on the site was under investigation for an illegal take. Id. at 625–
26. The landowner then joined in a suit seeking a judicial declaration that future development of
the area would not constitute a take. The district court ordered the Service to conduct an
environmental review, which culminated in a letter concluding that proposed development
would not only likely constitute a take of the cave species but also of two other listed bird
species, although the agency also opined that the development could be modified to avoid take
if it was scaled back from canyons and if surface and subsurface drainage and nutrient
exchange was provided. Id. at 626 (discussing Four Points Util. Joint Venture v. United States,
No. 93-CA-655 (W.D. Tex. 1993), and the Fish and Wildlife Service letter). Other legal
proceedings ensued, with the landowner attempting to obtain a formal decision on the permit,
which finally occurred in 1998. Id.
186 Id. at 627.
187 GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 169 F. Supp. 2d 648, 662, 664 (W.D. Tex. 2001),
aff’d, GDF Realty, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
188 GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 627 (“No authority need be cited for the fundamental and wellknown limitation on the power of our Federal Government: the Constitution grants it limited
and enumerated powers; those powers not so granted the Federal Government are retained by
the States.”) (citing United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596–601 (5th Cir. 2002)). The court quoted
Justice Kennedy’s statement that the Framers thought the division of power between the federal
and state governments necessary to the protection of fundamental liberties. Id. at 628 (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that freedom was enhanced
with two governments, rather than just one)).
189 Id. at 628. The other factors the court mentioned were 1) whether there was a
jurisdictional element in the statute; 2) whether there were any congressional findings or
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support from both the D.C. Circuit in the fly case and Fourth Circuit in the
red wolf case, the Fifth Circuit defined the regulated activity to be merely
cave species take, not a commercial land development scheme.190 In so
doing, it rejected the district court’s reliance on the interstate effects of the
landowner’s planned commercial development.191 Judge Barksdale observed
that although the effect of the ESA’s cave species’ regulation was to prohibit
commercial development, the ESA was not directly regulating commercial
development, only cave species take. Thus, the focus of the judicial inquiry
was not on the general conduct or the motivation of the regulated party, but
instead on the economic nature of the regulated activity—the take of cave
species—either alone or in combination with other regulated takes.192 The
court bolstered this conclusion with language from the Supreme Court’s
SWANCC opinion, suggesting that relying on the commercial motivation of
the regulated conduct would allow noncommercial actors to escape
regulation.193
With the focus thus narrowed to the effect of cave species take, the
Fifth Circuit proceeded to reject the government’s argument that the Texas
cave species themselves had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The court determined that the scientific interest generated by the species
and their possible future economic benefits was either negligible or too
hypothetical to satisfy Morrison’s requirement that there must be a close link
legislative history concerning the effect of the regulated activity on interstate commerce; and 3)
whether there was too attenuated a link between the interstate activity and the effect on
interstate commerce. Id. at 629 (relying on Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000)).
190 Id. at 635–36 (acknowledging that the other circuit decisions looked “at times to the
nature of the actor’s general conduct,” but interpreting the primary thrust of both decisions to
be based on the substantial commercial effects of fly take and red wolf take; in the former case,
through the loss of biodiversity).
191 Id. at 636 (“[T]he district court erred in looking primarily to the plaintiffs’ motivations.”).
192 Id. at 633 (“[W]e conclude that the scope of inquiry is primarily whether the expressly
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, i.e., whether takes, be they of the
Cave Species or of all endangered species in the aggregate, have the substantial effect.”). The
court interpreted both the NAHB decision, involving the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly, and the
Gibbs decision, involving the red wolf, as based partly (in the former, in Judge Henderson’s
concurrence) or primarily (in the latter) on the substantial effects of the regulated activities on
interstate commerce. Id. at 635–36.
193 Id. at 634 (quoting the Supreme Court’s observation in SWANCC that the Court had yet to
determine the “precise object or activity that, in the aggregate substantially affects interstate
commerce” (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001))). Although in SWANCC the Court
noted that the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction was grounded on the fact that the area at issue
contained water used by migratory birds, the government’s focus before the Court was on the
commercial nature of the landowner’s planned municipal landfill, “which is plainly of a
commercial nature.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (internal quotation omitted). On this point the
Court stated “But this is a far cry, indeed, from the ‘navigable waters’ and ‘waters of the United
States’ to which the statute by its terms extends.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that focusing on the effect that take regulations had on
planned commercial development “would allow application of otherwise unconstitutional
statutes to commercial actors but not to non-commercial actors,” claiming that such a line of
reasoning would uphold application of the GFSZA in Lopez to a possessor who was a significant
gun salesman, or application of VAWA in Morrison to a person who committed violence against
women and then sold a substantial number of videotapes of the encounter in interstate
commerce. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 634.
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between an intrastate activity and its effect on interstate commerce.194
Consequently, the court concluded that take of Texas cave species, with no
present or historic market (unlike red wolves) and only a possible future
market, had only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce.195 The court
therefore refused the government’s invitation to aggregate cave species take
with all other endangered species take to produce an aggregate substantial
effect on interstate commerce.196
Although it rejected aggregating acts with negligible interstate
commerce effects to produce a cumulative substantial effect, the Fifth
Circuit nevertheless upheld the application of the ESA’s take provision to
the cave species using the aggregation principle because it concluded that
this noncommercial, intrastate activity was essential to the ESA’s overall
economic regulatory scheme. The court reasoned that the ESA’s language,
legislative history, and application indicated that the statute was intended, in
the main, to regulate economic activity.197 Moreover, as “truly national”
legislation, the ESA did not conflict with areas of traditional state concern,
since authority over land use and wildlife preservation was shared with the
federal government.198 Further, the cave species take regulation was
“essential” to the ESA’s economic regulatory scheme because disavowing it
would “undercut” the ESA by allowing piecemeal extinctions, threaten the
“interdependent web” of all species, and undermine the ESA’s “essential
purpose” of protecting ecosystems upon which both humans and other
species depend.199
Thus, while rejecting the idea that the use of Commerce Clause power
could be justified by the commercial aspirations of the regulated entity, the
Fifth Circuit allowed aggregation of the effects of an intrastate activity with
the negligible effects on interstate commerce where the regulation was an
essential part of the ESA’s regulatory scheme—which was designed to
regulate mainly commercial activity. This reasoning, based on the rationality
of regulating both commercial and noncommercial activities, would sustain
all ESA take regulations under the Commerce Clause regardless of the
conduct or motivation of the activity subject to the regulation. The Fifth
Circuit thus echoed the concurrence in the flower-loving fly case concerning

194 GDF Realty, 326 F.3d. at 637–38 (concluding that any connection between the take of
cave species and effects on the scientific travel or publication industries was negligible, and
that future commercial benefits from the species—in terms of developments in understanding
longevity—was conjecture).
195 Id. at 636.
196 Id. at 638 (“To accept such a justification would render meaningless any ‘economic
nature’ prerequisite to aggregation. An activity cannot be aggregated based solely on the fact
that, post-aggregation, the sum of the activities will have a substantial effect on commerce. This
would vitiate Lopez and Morrison’s seeming requirement that the intrastate instance of the
activity be commercial.”).
197 Id. at 639 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000)).
198 Id. (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), for the
shared powers principle).
199 Id. at 640 (quoting the Fish and Wildlife Service’s brief and the ESA’s legislative history).
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the interdependence of species, and vindicated the overriding ecosystem
preservation purpose of the ESA.200
Judge Dennis wrote a concurrence which elaborated on the court’s
“comprehensive scheme” principle. He justified the ESA’s regulation of both
commercial and noncommercial species: Since their interrelationship is
central to the survival of both, it was rational for Congress to regulate
both.201 Judge Dennis added that the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper
Clause justified the cave species’ regulation in addition to the Commerce
Clause.202 He sustained the regulation under this rationale “because such
regulation is essential to the efficacy of—that is, the regulation is necessary
and proper to—the ESA’s comprehensive scheme . . . because the scheme
has a very substantial impact on interstate commerce.”203 Thus, the
commerce necessary to support the regulation came not from the motivation
of the regulated party or from the character of the regulated activity, but
from the comprehensive economic regulatory scheme of which the
regulation was an essential part.

D. The Arroyo Southwestern Toad and Commercial Land Development
Another species with a tenuous link to interstate commerce is the
arroyo southwestern toad (Bufo californicus), which lives in scattered
populations along the West Coast from Baja California, Mexico to Monterey
County, California. The toad breeds in shallow sand or gravel pools near
streams but spends most of its life in upland habitats, even though toads
venture no more than 1.2 miles from their natal streams.204 Largely due to
the loss of 76% of its California habitat as a result of land development, the
Secretary of Interior listed the toad as endangered in 1994.205
In 2000, this listing came into conflict with a 280-home residential
development proposed by Rancho Viejo along Keys Creek in San Diego
County. The developer proposed to use parts of the Keys Creek streambed,
which supplies toad habitat, for a “borrow area” to provide fill for home
construction on 52 upland acres.206 Because the development involved a

200 Id. at 640; cf. supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text (concerning Judge Henderson’s
concurrence); 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000) (ecosystem purpose of the ESA).
201 According to Judge Dennis, federal regulation of both commercial and noncommercial
activity is justified “if the regulation is an essential or integral part of a larger comprehensive
scheme properly regulating activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.” GDF Realty,
326 F.3d at 643 (Dennis, J., concurring).
202 Id. at 641–42 (citing, inter alia, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
203 Id. at 644.
204 See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton (Rancho Viejo), 323 F.3d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
205 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Designation of Critical Habitat for
the Arroyo Toad, 66 Fed. Reg. 9414 (Feb. 7, 2001). None of the toads at issue in the case travel
outside the state of California. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065 (citing Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Designation of Critical Habitat for the Arroyo Toad, 66
Fed. Reg. at 9415).
206 Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065 (noting that the developer intended “to remove six feet or
more of soil from the surface of the borrow area, amounting to approximately 750,000 cubic
yards of material,” for the housing sites).
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discharge of fill into waters of the United States, it required a section 404
permit under the Clean Water Act, which in turn triggered biological
consultation under the ESA.207 While consultation was underway, the
developer dug a trench and erected a fence along Keys Creek, which
impeded toad migration between the stream and the uplands, and which the
FWS determined, in May 2000, constituted an unauthorized take of the
toads.208 Three months later, in August 2000, the Service issued a biological
opinion which concluded that the planned excavation would result in the
taking of toads and would also jeopardize the continued existence of the
species. Consequently, the Service proposed an alternative that would use
fill dirt from off-site sources, thus allowing the development to proceed
without jeopardizing the toad.209 The developer decided not to remove the
fence or adopt the agency’s alternative; instead, it filed suit in federal district
court in the District of Columbia, alleging that application of the ESA to its
development was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.210 The
district court rejected the developer’s claim based on the D.C. Circuit’s
flower-loving fly decision four years earlier.211
The D.C. Circuit unanimously affirmed, on the basis of one of the
grounds in the divided ruling of the fly case.212 Judge Garland interpreted the
earlier decision as upholding the constitutionality of ESA’s take provision as
applied to the intrastate fly because the regulated activity substantially
affected commerce for two reasons: 1) the loss of biodiversity caused by the
take would have a substantial effect on ecosystems and therefore on
interstate commerce; and 2) the take provision regulated a commercial
development that clearly had interstate effects.213 The court concluded that
the second rationale governed the toad case.214
207 Id. (discussing the requirements of section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344,
and section 7 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536). Section 404 permit jurisdiction was also at issue in
SWANCC. See supra notes 90–107 and accompanying text.
208 Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065.
209
210
211

Id.
Id. at 1065–66.

Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,112 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2001).
Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1067.
213 Id. at 1067 (relying on NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046 n.3, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J.); id.
at 1057 (Henderson, J., concurring)). The fact that Judge Garland cited Judge Wald for the
proposition that the fly regulation was valid under the Commerce Clause seems somewhat of a
stretch, as her primary reasons for upholding the fly take regulation concerned the adverse
effects on biodiversity, and therefore commerce, that would result from the loss of the fly, and
that the regulation was a permissible regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. See
supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. Judge Wald also stated, however, that the fly
regulation substantially affected interstate commerce by preventing the destruction of
interstate competition that is harmful to the environment and, in doing so, mentioned that “the
statute in this case regulates the taking of endangered species in the process of constructing a
hospital, power plant, and intersection that will likely serve an interstate population.” NAHB,
130 F.3d at 1056.
214 The court did not reject the biodiversity rationale embraced by the NAHB court, noting,
“In focusing on the second NAHB rationale, we do not mean to discredit the first.” Rancho
Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1067 n.2. The court later observed:
212
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Like the hospital and the intersection in the fly case,215 the 200-acre
development—the activity regulated by the ESA take provision—was,
according to the D.C. Circuit, “plainly an economic enterprise.”216 Thus, the
effect of the development could be considered with other similar
developments in the aggregate, and from that perspective the court had “no
doubt” there was a rational basis for the government’s contention that the
residential housing development had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.217
Perhaps the developer’s strongest argument (the court labeled it the
“principal argument”) was that Morrison “came pretty close” to adopting a
categorical rule against regulating noneconomic activity regardless of its
effect on interstate commerce.218 Since the toad was “not itself ‘the subject
of commercial activity,’” the developer maintained that the effects of its take
could not be aggregated to produce a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.219 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in the cave species case,220 the D.C.
Circuit rejected this line of reasoning, concluding that since “the ESA
regulates takings, not toads,” the “regulated activity [was therefore] the
planned commercial development, not “the arroyo toad that it threatens.”221
The court emphasized that penalties and prohibitions of section 9 of the ESA
apply to “the persons who do the taking, not to the species that are taken.”222
Reinforcing the same point, Judge Garland quoted from Morrison to
assert that “‘the proper inquiry’ is whether the challenge is to ‘a regulation of
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.’”223 Moreover,
according to the court, regulating a housing development was clearly
regulating commercial activity, which was materially different from

There is ESA legislative history that supports the other primary rationale relied upon in
NAHB—the effect of the loss of biodiversity on interstate commerce. There are also
express findings and legislative history indicating that Congress enacted the ESA out of
concern that land development and habitat modification were leading to species
extinction and had to be controlled by federal legislation.

Id. at 1069 n.5 (citation omitted).
215 The D.C. Circuit rejected the developer’s assertion that the flower-loving fly decision was
no longer good law in the wake of Morrison and SWANCC. Id. at 1070–71. The court ruled that
Morrison only clarified the Lopez framework, it did not change it. And while the language of
SWANCC suggested that courts must clearly discern the “precise object or activity” that
substantially affected interstate commerce, the district court had done just that by pointing to
the housing development. Id. at 1071 (citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173).
216 Id. at 1068.
217 Id. at 1070.
218 Id. at 1071–72 (quoting Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4, Rancho Viejo (No. 01-5373)).
219 Id. at 1072 (quoting Appellant’s Reply Brief at 15, Rancho Viejo (No. 01-5373)).
220 The cave species decision was handed down on March 26, 2003; the toad case was issued
less than a week later, on April 1, 2003. Thus, neither opinion influenced the other.
221 Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072 (emphasis deleted). The court elaborated: “The ESA does
not purport to tell toads what they may or may not do. Rather, [the statute] limits the taking of
listed species.” Id.
222 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000) (“Except as provided . . . it is unlawful for any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take any such species . . . .) (emphasis
added); id. § 1540 (“Any person who knowingly violates . . . “) (emphasis added)).
223 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000)).
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regulating gender-motivated violence in Morrison or gun possession in
Lopez, where “neither the actors nor their conduct had a commercial
character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute had an
evident commercial nexus.”224 Judge Garland quoted from the ESA’s findings
to show that its purpose was to regulate “economic growth and development
untempered by adequate concern and conservation” which produced species
extinctions.225
The court also rejected the developer’s allegations that the ESA had an
unconstitutional noneconomic purpose of preserving biodiversity, and that
the regulation at issue impermissibly preserved toads with no economic
value. First, the court reaffirmed Judge Wald’s sentiments in the flowerloving fly case to the effect that “there is no question that the commercial
value of preserving species diversity played an important role in Congress’
deliberations.”226 Second, the court noted that, like many statutes, the ESA
had multiple purposes, which included economic concerns, and judicial
attempts to discern a “true or primary legislative purpose” were an unwise
recipe for judicial intervention into the political process.227 Third, Judge
Garland observed that both Morrison and Lopez affirmed the “long held” and
continuously exercised capability of Congress to employ the Commerce
Clause to achieve noneconomic ends.228 For example, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002,229 prohibiting the use or possession of explosives,
weapons of mass destruction, and firearms by convicted felons, was not
enacted, the court stated, “merely (or even primarily) to protect commercial
property.”230
Finally, the D.C. Circuit rejected the developer’s claim that the ESA
amounted to an unlawful intrusion on land-use decisions, an alleged area of
traditional state regulation, because the court ruled that the ESA is not a
general land-use statute.231 Instead, the court stated that “the ESA represents
a national response to a specific problem of ‘truly national’ concern.”232
Relying heavily on Chief Judge Wilkinson’s opinion in the red wolf case, the
D.C. Circuit agreed that the regulation of wildlife and natural resources is a
224 Id. (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring))).
225 Id. at 1072–73 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000)).
226 Id. at 1073 (citing NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, C.J.) and Gibbs, 214
F.3d 483, 494 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2000)).
227 Id. at 1073–74.
228 Id. at 1073–76 (citing, inter alia, Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 355–57 (1903)
(upholding a federal statute banning interstate transport of lottery tickets, passed “for the
protection of public morals”); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 317–320 (1913) (upholding
the Mann Act, which prohibited the transport of women in interstate commerce “for immoral
purposes”)).
229 Pub. L. No. 107-276, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 6 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 44 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.).
230 Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d. at 1075 (citing Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107296, § 1123, 116 Stat. 2135, 2283–85). Nor, according to the court, did Congress make the murder
of public safety officers a federal crime or ban the shipment of child pornography for
commercial reasons. Id. at 1075–76.
231 Id. at 1078.
232 Id. at 1078–79.
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power shared between the federal government and the states, and therefore
the ESA did not “‘trench impermissibly upon state powers.’”233 Also, Judge
Garland agreed with the Fourth Circuit that federal regulation of endangered
species and their habitat was necessary to “arrest the ‘race to the bottom’”
that would occur from interstate economic competition “‘whose overall
effect would damage the quality of the national environment.’”234
Judge Garland concluded with a call for judicial restraint by quoting
Morrison : “‘Due respect for the decision of a coordinate branch of
Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only
upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional
bounds.’”235 Since the developer in Rancho Viejo made no such “plain
showing,” the court upheld the application of the arroyo southwestern toad
regulation to the proposed housing development as indistinguishable from
the challenge to the hospital development that the D.C. Circuit rejected
earlier in the flower-loving fly decision.236
Chief Judge Ginsberg wrote a brief concurrence which emphasized
that, under Lopez, there must be a “logical stopping point to [the Court’s]
rationale” for upholding congressional exercise of Commerce Clause
power.237 He found this stopping point in the toad case in the fact that the
regulated “large-scale residential development” substantially affected
interstate commerce.238 But, he cautioned, a “lone biker in the woods” or a
“homeowner who moves dirt in order to landscape his property” does not
affect interstate commerce by executing an action that produces a take of
the listed toad.239 He was convinced that “[w]ithout this limitation, the
Government could regulate as a take any kind of activity regardless whether
that activity had any connection with interstate commerce.”240 The majority
did not share Chief Judge Ginsberg’s sentiment that the ESA could not reach
an individual hiker or hunter.241

233

Id. at 1079 (quoting Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483, 500–01 (4th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 1079 (quoting Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 501). Judge Wald also endorsed this rationale in the
flower-loving fly case. See supra note 123.
235 Id. at 1080 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000)).
236 Id.
237 Id. (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)).
238 Id. (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
239 Id. (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring). A more destructive beneficiary of the exemption for
234

small actors Judge Ginsberg would create are off-road vehicle enthusiasts who destroy
endangered species habitat in pursuit of recreation.
240 Id. (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
241 Judge Garland observed that in Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that “‘where a
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” Id. at 1077 (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558). Judge Garland concluded that “because much activity regulated by the ESA
does bear a substantial relation to commerce, it may well be that the hiker hypothetical . . . is ‘of
no consequence’ to the statute’s constitutionality.” Id. Judge Garland also noted that the
application of the ESA to hikers or toad hunters could be also be upheld on the biodiversity
rationale endorsed in NAHB. Id. at 1077 n.20.
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IV. WOULD THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLD THE TAKE REGULATION?
The four decisions discussed above are notable for their fractured
reasoning, so even though there is no split among the circuits in terms of
results, there is hardly agreement on the reasons why the take provision of
the ESA is constitutional. In addition, two of the decisions prompted
dissents from well-known members of the Federalist Society, Judges Luttig
and Sentelle,242 so it is possible that the Supreme Court might decide to take
up the issue, even without a circuit split.243
The key question in the cases concerns the circumstances under which
aggregation of effects is permissible since, if it is, the links between listed
species and interstate commerce can be readily demonstrated. In Morrison,
the Court refused to rule out aggregating noncommercial species, but Chief
Justice Rehnquist rationalized all past cases in which the Court allowed
aggregation as involving “some sort of economic endeavor.”244 Related to
that question are questions about the proper scope of aggregation, whether
potential but unknown effects may be used to produce substantial effects on
commerce, and whether these effects are so attenuated that they would
countenance virtually all assertions of federal power.245 We focus on the
critical commercial character question first.

A. The Commercial Nexus
The reasoning of courts of appeal on the economic nature of the
activity breaks down into three different categories: 1) decisions
emphasizing the substantial commercial effects of the listed species, 2)
242 See Simon Lazarus, Don’t Be Fooled: They’re Activists Too, WASH. POST, June 3, 2001, at
B3 (describing the rise of the Federalist Society and noting Judge Luttig as “one of the most
outspoken advocates of the new judicial federalism”); Marcia Coyle, Panel That Chose Starr Has
Conservative Ties, THE NAT. L.J., Aug. 22, 1994, at A13 (noting Judge Sentelle’s connections with
the Federalist Society in the context of the Clinton investigations).
243 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on Gibbs and NAHB. Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145
(2001); Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders of the U.S. v. Babbitt, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). The D.C. Circuit
denied en banc rehearing in Rancho Viejo on July 22, 2003. Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d
1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Both Judge Sentelle and Judge Roberts filed dissents to the denial of
rehearing. Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d at 1158–60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); id. at 1160
(Roberts, J., dissenting). Judge Sentelle’s dissent echoed his earlier dissent in NAHB, 130 F.3d
1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), arguing that the taking of the toad did not
have a substantial relationship to interstate commerce because the regulated activity was not
economic. Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d at 1158–60. Both he and Judge Roberts also
maintained that rehearing was proper because Rancho Viejo’s reasoning in relying on the
regulated activity’s substantial relationship to interstate commerce was now at odds with the
Fifth Circuit. Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d at 1158–60 (Sentelle & Roberts, J.J., dissenting)
(noting the split with GDF Realty, 326 F.3d 622, 634–35 (5th Cir. 2003)). GDF Realty has filed a
petition to the Fifth Circuit to rehear and rehear en banc. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit Case Summary, GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton (No. 01-51099) (on file with
author). See infra Section VI.
244 Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000). See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
245 See Nagle, supra note 116, at 191 (suggesting the first two questions); Funk, supra note
92, at 10,769–70 (discussing the latter two). On the last question, see supra notes 58–60 and
accompanying text.
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decisions emphasizing the substantial commercial effects of the regulated
activities taking the listed species, and 3) decisions emphasizing the
comprehensiveness of the ESA’s economic scheme. In the latter category,
we include the biodiversity defense recognized by the D.C. Circuit in the fly
case and the avoidance of destructive interstate competition discussed by
Judge Wald in the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the full panel of the
D.C. Circuit in the toad case, because they help to explain the commercial
functions served by the ESA’s comprehensive scheme.

1. The Commercial Effects of Listed Species
We think the easiest case for the Supreme Court to sustain the ESA’s
take provision is the red wolf case, because the Fourth Circuit determined
that the species itself had substantial effects on interstate commerce.246
Chief Judge Wilkinson concluded that the taking of red wolves on private
land was an economic activity for a variety of reasons: 1) farmers took
wolves for economic reasons, such as to protect livestock;247 2) conversely,
wolf taking could substantially harm commerce by removing an important
predator of animals that eat farmers’ crops;248 and 3) the loss of red wolves
would, in the aggregate, have “quite direct” effects on interstate commerce
by damaging tourism, inhibiting scientific research, and thwarting a possible
renewed trade in wolf pelts.249 The court cited studies indicating that red
wolf recovery could produce perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars in
tourism annually.250 In light of these assertions, we think a majority of the
Supreme Court would have little difficulty in affirming the Fourth Circuit.
But the trouble with this line of reasoning is that it would uphold the
constitutionality of the ESA’s take provision only with respect to megafauna,
which do not constitute the majority of listed species. For those species
which are little known and which generate no interstate travel for science or
recreation—like the flower-loving fly, the cave species, or the arroyo toad—
this defense of the ESA take provision is less than half a loaf.

2. The Commercial Nature of Regulated Take
An alternative defense, which we think the Court would also embrace,
concerns the interstate commercial effects of the activity subject to ESA
regulation. This rationale engendered the most disagreement among the
circuit courts. The D.C. Circuit in the arroyo toad case was the most notable
246

Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483, 492–97 (4th Cir. 2000); see supra notes 158–59 and accompanying

text.
247
248
249

Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.
Id. at 495 (noting that red wolves prey on raccoons, deer, and rabbits).
Id. at 492–95; see supra note 161 and accompanying text. The dissenter, Judge Luttig,

denied that the loss of all of the estimated 41 red wolves on private land would have any effect
on interstate commerce. Id. at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
250 See id. at 493–94 (citing a study by a Cornell University researcher that estimated an
increase in tourism-related dollars of between $39 million and $183 million in northeastern
North Carolina and between $132 million and $354 million in the Great Smoky National Park).
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adherent to this view, upholding the constitutionality of the application of
the take provision by focusing on the commercial nature of the residential
development that was proposed.251 Both Chief Judge Wilkinson for the
Fourth Circuit in the red wolf case and Judge Henderson concurring in the
flower-loving fly case approved reliance on the commercial nature of the
regulated activity as supplementary to their primary reasoning.252 Relying on
the economic activity being regulated draws support from both the language
of the statute253 and the language of the Supreme Court.254
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit in the cave species case overruled a
district court decision because it relied on the planned commercial
development of the site, ruling that the lower court wrongly defined the
scope of the regulated activity.255 The Fifth Circuit stated that it was
improper to consider the commercial motivations of the regulated conduct
which, among other things, would allow regulation of commercially
motivated take but would make regulation of noncommercial take
unconstitutional.256 The court felt that such a result would be inconsistent
with the successful facial challenges in Lopez and Morrison.257

251 Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see supra notes 216–25 and
accompanying text.
252 Chief Judge Wilkinson noted the economic motivation of those who took red wolves on
private land, even though he relied primarily on the interstate effects the loss of the species
would produce. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495. Judge Henderson included the economic nature of the
intersection for the hospital as supplementary to her reliance on the biodiversity defense.
NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1058–59 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Henderson, J., concurring). See also Shields v.
Babbitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 638, 663 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that the regulated activity—the
pumping of groundwater for agricultural purposes from the interstate Edwards Aquifer—was a
sufficient effect on interstate commerce), vacated on other grounds, Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d
832 (5th Cir. 2002).
253 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
254 In SWANCC, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that by relying on the aggregate value of
migratory birds affected by the development, the Seventh Circuit “raise[d] significant
constitutional questions” requiring a judicial inquiry into “the precise object or activity that, in
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001). He
also seemed to discount the government’s argument before the Court that, in addition to the
economic value of the migratory birds, the commercial nature of the municipal landfill fell
within the reach of the commerce power, stating: “This is a far cry, indeed, from the ‘navigable
waters’ and ‘waters of the United States’ to which the statute by its terms extends.” Id.
The first statement, directing the judicial inquiry into the “object or activity” being
regulated, seems to support the D.C. Circuit’s approach in the arroyo toad case, where the court
relied on the commercial nature of the residential development at issue. See supra notes 216–
17, 221–25 and accompanying text. However, the second statement appears to refocus the
judicial inquiry toward the “terms of the statute,” perhaps its purposes or goals. In the case of
the ESA, its express purpose is to protect listed species and the ecosystems that sustain them,
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000), seemingly lending support to the comprehensive scheme rationale
discussed below.
255 GDF Realty, 326 F.3d 622, 633–36 (5th Cir. 2003).
256 Id. at 634 (“To accept the district court’s analysis would allow application of otherwise
unconstitutional statutes to commercial actors, but not to non-commercial actors.”).
257 Id. at 635 (noting that if the constitutionality of the GFSZA turned on the commercial
motivations of the gun possessor, the statute as applied to a gun salesman would have passed
muster; similarly, VAWA would have been constitutional if the perpetrator of the violence sold
videotapes of the incident in interstate markets).
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The split between the D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit on this issue
illustrates the unsettled state of the law. The Fifth Circuit’s unwillingness to
consider the commercial nature of the regulated activity seems to
countenance a judicial disaggregation of the act of taking from the purpose
of the take. For example, according to Judge Sentelle, the dissenter in the
D.C. Circuit’s flower-loving fly case, the activity being regulated was “killing
flies[,] . . . controlling weeds[, and] . . . digging holes,” not constructing an
intersection to facilitate traffic flow to the hospital.258 This parsing allowed
him to assert that the take was neither “inherently nor fundamentally
commercial in any sense.”259 Distinguishing the actual act of taking from the
purpose of the take in this manner seems like an invitation to engage in legal
legerdemain permitting judges to declare unconstitutional regulations they
personally oppose. This invitation to government by the judiciary led to
unhappy results a century ago in what has become known as the Lochner
Era.260 As Chief Judge Wilkinson in the red wolf case warned, “a judge’s view
of the wisdom of enacted polices affords no warrant for declaring them
unconstitutional.”261
But the D.C. Circuit’s position, focusing on the commercial nature of
the regulated activity, is also troublesome. As Chief Judge Ginsberg’s
concurrence in the arroyo toad case made clear, this approach means that
while the ESA could regulate a 200-acre residential development, regulation
of a “lone hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who moves dirt in order to
landscape his property” would be unconstitutional.262 Although Judge
Ginsberg did not mention them, a far greater threat to listed species may
come from off-road vehicle enthusiasts. While it might make sense for a
regulatory scheme to exempt small takes, that seems like a political or
administrative decision. Why the Constitution should demand such
exemptions is hardly clear.

3. The Commercial Nature of the ESA’s Comprehensive Scheme
A third rationale for sustaining the ESA’s take provision on the grounds
of the commercial effects of the species was provided by both the Fourth
Circuit in the red wolf case and the Fifth Circuit in the cave species case,
where those courts ruled that the take provision was constitutional because
the take provision was an essential part of the ESA’s economic regulatory
structure.263 This reasoning is attractive from an environmental perspective
because it avoids questions over whether the listed species has commercial
258
259
260

NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
Id.
See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE

CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9–31 (1992) (describing the structure of what Horwitz termed the
“classical legal thought” of the Lochner Era).
261 Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483, 504 (4th Cir. 2000).
262 Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Ginsberg, C.J., concurring).
263 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497–99; see supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text (Fourth
Circuit); GDF Realty, 326 F.3d 622, 639–40 (5th Cir. 2003); see supra notes 197–200 and
accompanying text (Fifth Circuit).
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effects, or whether the regulated activity is commercial in nature.264 Instead,
its focus is on the nature of the statute—whether, for example, the ESA is

264 The comprehensive scheme rationale set forth in Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995), is
properly understood to apply to activities both intrastate and non-commercial, not just
intrastate activities. Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated the scheme rationale not only to
authorize courts to aggregate intrastate activity, which under Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), was already possible, but instead as a means of considering facially non-commercial
activity to be “economic” for purposes of the statute. This subtle but crucial distinction explains
why the Chief Justice did not consider the scheme rationale in either Lopez and Morrison as
part of his discussion of aggregation of intrastate activity but instead as the first factor in the
four-factor “substantially affects” analysis: whether the statute regulates commerce or an
“economic” activity. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). In
discussing whether an activity was “economic” the Chief Justice noted:

Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce”
or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.
Section 992(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
unregulated.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supports this interpretation, maintaining
that so long as a regulation is part of a statute that is economic in “purpose[] and design,” the
regulation has an “evident commercial nexus,” and is therefore constitutional. Id. at 580
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. We believe that the Court’s
recognition that the commerce clause could justify regulation of some non-commercial activity
was the reason the Court refused to adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of
non-economic activity. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
Note also that the Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence has always viewed whether an
activity was commercial in nature as a term of art, to be understood in broad terms, and the
Court long ago rejected the notion that an activity could be economic only through its direct
effects. Indeed, Lopez quoted approvingly from Wickard to the effect that “‘even if . . . [an]
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce.’” Lopez,
514 U.S. at 555 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. 113, 125 (1942)). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574
(recognizing the Court’s evolution “from an understanding of commerce that would serve only
an 18th-century economy”); United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1228 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The
construction of the term ‘commerce’ is a practical one and embraces economic activity beyond
that which is traditionally considered commerce.”); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 262
(3d Cir. 2000) (“We thus hold that although the connection to economic or commercial activity
plays a central role in whether a law is valid under the Commerce Clause, we hold that
economic activity can be understood in broad terms.”); Groome v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d
192, 208–09 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Although the connection to economic or commercial activity plays
a central role in whether a regulation will be upheld under the Commerce Clause, economic
activity must be understood in broad terms. Indeed, a cramped view of commerce would
cripple a foremost federal power and in so doing would eviscerate national authority.” (quoting
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491)).
Several circuit court decisions have used the comprehensive scheme rationale to sustain
regulation of noncommercial activities outside the context of the ESA. See, e.g., Freier v.
Westinghouse Elec. Co., 303 F.3d 176, 201 (2nd Cir. 2002) (upholding a provision of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act imposing a federal
commencement date, even though the provision had no connection to interstate commerce,
because it was an integral part of the “regulatory program”), cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 1899 (2003);
cf. United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 678 (5th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1006 (1998)
(noncommercial, intrastate activity—threats and intimidation directed at provider of abortion
services—may be aggregated to find substantial effect). See also infra note 272 for other
examples of courts upholding regulation under the scheme principle.
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designed to regulate commercial activity, and whether the take regulation is
an essential part of the regulatory scheme.265 The Fourth, Fifth, and D.C.
Circuits all have ruled that the ESA was at least in part an economic
regulatory scheme.266 And the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion in the cave species
case that the take provision was central to the ESA finds support in the
express congressional concern over the “critical nature of the
interrelationships of plants and animals between themselves and with their
environment” and in the legislative history’s proclamation that the ESA’s
“essential purpose” is “to protect the ecosystems upon which we and other
species depend.”267
Perhaps more importantly, the “essential part of a comprehensive
economic regulatory scheme” defense has grounding in the Supreme Court’s
recent federalism cases. In Lopez, for example, the Court struck down the
GFSZA in part because it was “not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated.”268 The Lopez opinion did not make
clear whether the regulated activity must be commercial in order to
aggregate its effects. But over two decades ago, in upholding the
constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, the
Court noted that “a complex regulatory program . . . can survive a
Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that every single facet of the
program is independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal.
It is enough that the challenged provisions are an integral part of the
regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a
whole satisfies this test.”269 The Fifth Circuit in the cave species case
interpreted Lopez to authorize regulation of noncommercial, intrastate
species if: 1) the statute was directed at activity that is economic in nature;
and 2) the regulated noncommercial activity is an essential part of the
overall economic regulatory scheme.270
265

Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498; GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639.
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 494 n.3; GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640 (citing the ESA’s language and
legislative history); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1073–74.
266
267

H.R. REP. NO. 93–412, at 6, 10 (1973).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
269 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981). See also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 n.22 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of the Public Utility
Regulatory Practices Act of 1978, drawing support from Hodel ’ s comprehensive scheme
rationale); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968) (holding that “where a general
regulatory scheme bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”).
270 GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639–40 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 561). The Fifth Circuit cited
the ESA’s legislative history for its conclusion that the ESA’s protection of endangered species
is economic in nature. Id. at 632, 639 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 4–5 (1973), for the
proposition that the value of biodiversity is “incalculable” and “it is in the best interest of
mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations . . . [because they] are potential resources”
that might otherwise be lost absent ESA regulation, and citing S. REP. NO. 91–526, at 3 (1969),
for the proposition that marketing species and their genetic material may constitute commercial
value that would otherwise have been eliminated from commerce). The court also noted that in
addition to the adverse economic effects of species loss, most of these costs would be imposed
by economic activities. Id. at 639 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1), (f) (2000)). Finally, the court
268
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lopez observed that so
long as a regulation is a part of a statute that is economic in “purpose[] and
design,” the regulation is constitutional,271 thus suggesting that the requisite
commercial link for Commerce Clause purposes could be found in the
statutory structure as well as in the commercial nature of the listed species
or the regulated activities.272 Justice Kennedy noted that “Congress can
regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single
market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy.”273 He also
emphasized that the constitutional framework has been flexible enough,
over the course of two centuries, to accommodate enormous changes in the
power of the federal government.274 It seems quite possible that Justice
Kennedy might see that flexibility as sufficient to accommodate the ESA
take provision, particularly in light of the fact that wildlife regulation is not a
traditional function to which the states “lay claim by right of history and
expertise”275 because the Court recently ruled that wildlife regulation is a
power that states share with the federal government.276 Thus, we think it is

concluded that the ESA is “truly national” legislation—not an invasion of traditional areas of
state concern—because land use control and wildlife preservation are areas of shared federal
and state authority. Id.
271 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
272 Id. at 579. Circuit courts have relied upon the “essential part of a larger . . . regulatory
scheme [that] could be undercut unless the intrastate activity was regulated” rationale to
support Commerce Clause constitutionality in numerous other contexts as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Adams, 343 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In contrast to Lopez, here the
statute criminalizing possession of child pornography is an essential part of a [larger economic
regulatory scheme.]”); United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 338 (7th Cir. 2000) (same, involving
a statute that criminalized the possession of child pornography); United States v. Rodia, 194
F.3d 465, 479 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 201–03 (2d
Cir. 2002) (concluding that the federally required commencement date is constitutional because
it “is an integral part of the regulatory scheme established by the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675, furthering
CERCLA’s goals in various ways”) cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 1899 (2003); United States v. Cortes,
299 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding a car-jacking statute constitutional because it was
an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992);
United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d
589, 602–04 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the regulation of asbestos removal was proper because
it was an essential part of a larger economic regulatory scheme); United States. v. Haney, 264
F.3d 1161, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the prohibition of post-1986 machine guns was
Constitutional because it was an essential part of the federal scheme to regulate interstate
commerce in dangerous weapons); United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1997)
(holding that a provision of the Youth Handgun Safety Act that prohibits juveniles from
possessing handguns was constitutional because it was an essential part of a larger regulatory
scheme).
273 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
274 Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157
(1992)).
275 Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
276 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999). See also
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–39 (1979) (holding that state regulation of wildlife is
circumscribed by the federal commerce power).
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unlikely that Justice Kennedy would see wildlife regulation in the same light
that he viewed education in the Lopez case.277
Also worth noting is Justice Kennedy’s statement that where a statute’s
“purpose and design” has no “commercial nexus,” and where “neither the
actors nor their conduct has a commercial character,” the proper judicial
inquiry becomes whether “the exercise of national power seeks to intrude
upon an area of traditional concern of the state.”278 Under this reasoning,
whether a federal statute intrudes on an area of traditional state concern
becomes a relevant consideration only where a statute attempts to regulate
noncommercial activity. The inference of course is that not all federal
regulation of noncommercial activity is proscribed. Justice Kennedy agreed
that the GFSZA in Lopez exceeded the federal commerce power because it
regulated non-commercial conduct and it intruded on a traditional area of
state concern.279
Both the Fourth Circuit in the red wolf case and the D.C. Circuit in the
arroyo toad case expressly rejected the notion that the ESA’s regulation of
wildlife intruded on a traditional area of exclusive state concern.280 Since the
Court recently ruled that wildlife and land-use regulation are powers shared
between the federal and state governments,281 it would seem unlikely that
the Supreme Court would disturb these conclusions. Thus, it may be that
under Justice Kennedy’s two-part test, the ESA’s take provision would
withstand constitutional scrutiny even if the Court concluded it regulated
noncommercial activity.282
Another defense of the ESA take provision based on the commercial
effects of the species was supplied by the majority in the flower-loving fly
case, where the D.C. Circuit ruled that the loss of the listed species would
adversely affect biodiversity, and this loss would substantially affect
interstate commerce.283 Judges Wald and Henderson agreed that the
277 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t is well established that education is
a traditional concern of the States.”).
278 Id. at 580; see supra notes 70, 73, and accompanying text.
279 Justice Kennedy observed: “The statute now before us forecloses the States from
experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right
of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce
in the ordinary and usual sense of that term.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
280 Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483, 499–501 (4th Cir. 2000); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062, 1078–80 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
281 Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 204 (“Although States have important
interests in regulating wildlife and natural resources within their borders, this authority is
shared with the Federal Government when the Federal Government exercises one of its
enumerated constitutional powers . . . .”). Note, however, that Justice O’Connor was the author
of this opinion, while Justice Kennedy was part of the four-member dissent.
282 Although in Morrison Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that economic activity was a
prerequisite to aggregating effects, he did not rule out aggregating noneconomic effects.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (suggesting only that the Court’s cases in which it has
aggregated effects to produce a substantial effect on interstate commerce all involved “some
sort of economic endeavor”).
283 NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J.); id. at 1059 (Henderson, J.). Judge
Wald, alone among the appellate judges considering the constitutionality of the take provision
of the ESA, upheld the provision on the basis that it was a proper regulation of the channels of
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regulation of take of listed species is justified by the Commerce Clause,
since take affects the biodiversity of supporting ecosystems, the loss of
which would substantially affect interstate commerce.284 This rationale has
the advantage of conforming the law to ecological reality,285 which is of
considerable concern to those worried about the constitutive aspects of
environmental law.286 We think, however, that the biodiversity defense is
best combined with, and made part of, the comprehensive scheme rationale
because an express purpose of the ESA—the comprehensive scheme—is the
protection of ecosystems.287 We also think that the comprehensive scheme
rationale would be bolstered by arguing that without an ESA that
comprehensively protects all listed species, the result would be a predictable
destructive interstate “race to the bottom,” with states competing for
economic development that undermines species protection and biodiversity.
This rationale was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Association v. Hodel 288 and by the Fourth and D.C.
Circuits in the ESA cases.289

interstate commerce. Id. at 1046–48 (Wald, J.); see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
Given the lack of judicial enthusiasm for this line of reasoning, we do not pursue it here.
284 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052 (Wald, J.) (noting that “current and future interstate commerce
relies on the availability of a diversity array of species”); id. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring)
(concluding that “the loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and
likewise interstate commerce”). Chief Judge Wald thought that even unknown species might
have genetic, medicinal, and other commercial worth. Id. at 1052. However, Judge Henderson
thought this potential commercial effect was too speculative for Commerce Clause purposes;
she instead focused on the interconnectedness of all species. Id. at 1058 (Henderson, J.,
concurring). Although the D.C. Circuit in the arroyo toad case did not rely upon the biodiversity
defense, the court did cite it favorably. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069 n.5 (noting ESA
legislative history supporting the biodiversity defense); see supra note 214 and accompanying
text.
285 For more on the biological and ecological “interconnectedness,” see ROBERT P.
MCINTOSH, THE BACKGROUND OF ECOLOGY: CONCEPT & THEORY (1985); FRANK B. GOLLEY, A
HISTORY OF THE ECOSYSTEM CONCEPT IN ECOLOGY: MORE THAN THE SUM OF THE PARTS 19–22
(1993); DONALD WORSTER, NATURE’S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 199–202 (1985);
Steward T.A. Pickett et al., The New Paradigm in Ecology: Implications for Conservation
Biology Above the Species Level, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
NATURE CONSERVATION PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 65 (1992); DANIEL B. BOTKIN,
DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990). For articles on
the relationship of ecological interconnectedness and the law, see Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of
Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875 (1994); Reed F. Noss, Some
Principles of Conservation Biology as They Apply to the Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893 (1994);
Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the Law: Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 CHI.KENT L. REV. 911 (1994).
286 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
295 (2003).
287 16 U.S.C § 1531(b) (2000) (proclaiming that the purpose of the ESA is, inter alia, “to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species
depend may be conserved”).
288 452 U.S. 264, 281–82 (1981); see supra notes 29,123.
289 Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483, 501–02 (4th Cir. 2000); NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1049; Rancho Viejo, 323
F.3d at 1069, 1079; see supra notes 123 (fly), 172 (wolf), 234 (toad), and accompanying text.
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B. Statutory Links to Interstate Commerce
Interpreting Lopez, the Morrison Court listed two factors to consider
regarding whether a Commerce Clause regulation substantially affects
interstate commerce, in addition to the economic nature of the regulated
activity. First, an express jurisdictional element in the statute explicitly
limiting the regulation to effects on interstate commerce can support a
judicial conclusion that an interstate activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.290 Second, congressional findings or legislative history
can help courts discern substantial effects in interstate commerce, even
when not “visible to the naked eye.”291 Neither the GFSZA in Lopez nor
VAWA in Morrison contained a statutory jurisdictional element, although
VAWA did contain numerous congressional findings concerning the serious
adverse effects of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce.292
However, the Morrison Court rejected VAWA’s congressional findings,
determining that accepting them would allow Congress “to completely
obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local
authority.”293 Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that VAWA’s findings—which
maintained that gender-motivated violence substantially affected interstate
commerce by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from
working in interstate businesses, and from engaging in interstate business
transactions—were too attenuated to preserve any limits on Congress’s
commerce power.294 Thus, the presence or lack of legislative findings seems
less significant than the attenuation principle, discussed below.
In the case of the ESA, the statute expressly links species loss to
unwise economic growth and development.295 It also mentions the “esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value” of
healthy species to the nation, which would include economic value.296 In
addition, the ESA’s legislative history includes findings about the importance
of biodiversity to commerce, particularly potential medicinal effects.297
These findings may be enough to convince a majority of the Court of the
rationality of Congress’s determination that failure to preserve listed species
would, in the aggregate, substantially harm interstate commerce. However,
since there is nothing in the statute ensuring that each listed species has

290
291
292

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995); Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in

1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1853; S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 40 (1993); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 33 (1990)).
293 Id. at 615.
294 Id. (“The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the but-for causal chain . . . to
every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce.”).
295 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000).
296 Id. § 1531(a)(3).
297 H.R. REP. NO 93-412, at 5 (1973) (mentioning medicinal benefits); S. REP. 93-307, at 2
(1973) (noting that many species perform vital biological functions, and that biological diversity
is necessary for scientific purposes); see also supra note 127 (noting that species-derived
prescription medicines had a value of $15 billion in 1983 and that the “option value” of
biodiversity is estimated at $33 trillion per year).
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substantial commercial effects,298 we think it would be wise for the listing
agencies to include in their listing decisions a discussion of the substantial
actual and potential effects of that species on interstate commerce. Even if
they do, that reasoning will be subject to judicial scrutiny under the
attenuation principle.299

C. The Proper Scope of Aggregation and the Attenuation Principle
In both Lopez and Morrison, the Court concluded that the government’s
claims about the links of gun possession within school zones and gendermotivated violence to commerce were too attenuated.300 The Court refused
to follow the government’s proffered reasoning in Lopez : Gun possession in
school zones leads to violence; violence increases insurance rates, inhibits
interstate travel, and retards the educational process, all adversely affecting
national productivity and interstate commerce.301 Similarly, the Court
thought that Congress’s claim that gender-motivated violence deterred
interstate travel, employment, and business suffered from the same
deficiency: The “but-for” causal chain employed could authorize federal
regulation of “any crime, as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of
that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or
consumption.”302 The trouble with each statute—the lack of a stopping point
short of complete federalization—might also characterize the ESA.
The attenuation principle affects the proper scope of aggregation. The
key question is whether, assuming that aggregation is permissible, the
effects of a species take can be aggregated to include the loss of all members
of that species, or indeed members of all listed species? Or are those one or
two bridges too far? If they are not, a substantial effect on interstate
commerce is much more likely to be demonstrated. The Supreme Court has
yet to pronounce the proper scope of aggregation, except for Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s suggestion in Morrison that the aggregation in Wickard v.
Filburn 303—where the Court aggregated a farmer’s on-farm consumption of
wheat to all on-farm consumption by similarly situated farmers304—was
“perhaps the most far reaching example” available.305 The circuit courts
298 Professor Funk has suggested that all three categories of waters currently regulated
under the CWA—1) waters used by interstate travelers, 2) waters from which fish or shellfish
are marketed in interstate commerce, and 3) waters used by interstate industries—possess the
requisite jurisdictional element of a direct effect on interstate commerce. Funk, supra note 92,
at 10,770.
299 Of course, ESA listings that discussed the substantial commercial effects of listed species
would also be subject to scrutiny under the attenuation principle.
300 Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–17 (2000).
301 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–64.
302 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
303 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
304 Id. at 127–28 (ruling that Filburn’s “contribution to the demand for wheat,” though
perhaps insignificant itself, was “not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is
far from trivial”).
305 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (internal citations omitted).
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considering the aggregation issue in the context of the ESA have generally
upheld aggregation,306 but they have varied both in terms of the scope of the
permissible aggregation and the rationale for employing it.
The Fourth Circuit in the red wolf case concluded that because the take
of wolves involved economic activity, the loss of that species could be
aggregated to produce a substantial effect on interstate commerce, including
effects on future commerce.307 This is the easiest case to make concerning
the proper scope of aggregation: It is rational to conclude that the
unregulated loss of members of a species could lead to extinction of that
species, since that result has occurred many times in the past. If the loss of
that species itself would have substantial effects on present or future
commercial activity, that would not seem to offend the Court’s attenuation
principle, especially in the case of species like red wolves which have been
in interstate commerce in the past, and which arguably have substantial
effects on commerce today.308 This interpretation of the attenuation
principle, however, would not benefit species without those commerce
links, which probably includes most listed species.
A more challenging aggregation situation was the cave species case,
where the Fifth Circuit concluded that the government’s argument
concerning the potential medicinal benefits of these noneconomic species
was too speculative a basis upon which to ground aggregation.309 In other
words, these uncertain medicinal benefits were too attenuated to produce a
substantial effect on commerce.310 Therefore, the court refused to allow the
government to aggregate the effects of a loss of the cave species with all
other listed species.311 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit did approve
aggregating the effects of all listed species on the ground that regulation of
the cave species was an essential part of the ESA’s regulation of economic
activity.312
306 For example, the D.C. Circuit, in the toad case, found it unnecessary to consider the
aggregation issue because it determined that the developer’s planned commercial development
clearly had substantial commercial effects by itself. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 162, 1072 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (“Here . . . both the ‘actor,’ a real estate company, and its ‘conduct,’ the construction of a
housing development, have a plainly commercial character.”).
307 Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483, 493–97 (4th Cir. 2000); see supra notes 156–62 and accompanying
text. The Fourth Circuit did cite approvingly Judge Henderson’s concurrence in the fly case
concerning the idea that the extinction of one species would affect other species and their
ecosystems, and therefore would substantially affect interstate commerce. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at
497 (citing NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Henderson, J., concurring)).
308 See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493–94 (citing economic figures concerning red wolf-related
tourism).
309 GDF Realty, 326 F.3d 622, 638 (5th Cir. 2003).
310 Id. (“[I]n a sense, Cave Species takes are neither economic nor commercial. There is no
market for them; any future market is conjecture. If the speculative future medicinal benefits
from the Cave Species makes their regulation commercial, then almost anything would be.”).
311 Id. (“To accept such a justification would render meaningless any ‘economic nature’
prerequisite to aggregation.”).
312 Id. at 638–40. The D.C. Circuit in the toad case also noted that the design of the ESA was
“in part to regulate ‘economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation.’” Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 16 U.S.C. §
1531(a)(1)). See also note 225, infra.
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The Fourth Circuit in the wolf case also approved this rationale, under
which aggregation of all listed species is permissible as a vital component to
a comprehensive economic regulatory scheme.313 Both courts relied on the
Lopez opinion, where the Supreme Court stated that “where a general
regulatory scheme bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis
character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence.”314 This reasoning allows regulation of non-commercial
activities to be aggregated with regulation of commercial activities to
produce substantial commercial effects due to the commercial nature of the
regulatory scheme. This kind of aggregation would ratify regulation of all
listed species, not merely species with clear commercial links like the red
wolf. Whether it would offend the Court’s attenuation principle, forbidding
aggregations that would sanction unlimited federal regulation,315 is less
clear. However, we think that given the Court’s endorsement of the
comprehensive scheme rationale in Lopez,316 the fact that endangered
species regulation is not an area of traditional state concern,317 and Justice
Kennedy’s approval of statutes whose “purpose[] . . . [and] design . . . [have]
. . . evident commercial nexus,”318 aggregation based on the commercial
nature of the ESA’s regulatory scheme is not likely to be too attenuated for a
majority of the Court.
V. CONCLUSION
We believe that, as currently constituted, the Supreme Court would
likely uphold the constitutionality of the ESA’s take provision, although the
issue is certainly not free from doubt. The dissenters in the circuit court
decisions, Judges Sentelle and Luttig—well-known members of the
Federalist Society319—denied that the listed flower-loving fly and red wolf

313 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497–98; see also NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(“[B]ecause biodiversity has a real, substantial, and predictable effect on both the current and
future interstate commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under [the
ESA] is of no consequence.” (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (2000)) (internal quotation
omitted)).
314 See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)). See also GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639 (citing
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
315 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (rejecting the notion that Congress may “regulate any activity
that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens . . . [because under
such a rationale,] it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power”).
316 See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 163 & 313 and
accompanying text (Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Lopez).
317 See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J.
concurring) (worrying that if the federal government could “take over the regulation of entire
areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial
activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur”)); see
also supra note 280 (Fourth and D.C. Circuit’s conclusions that wildlife regulation is not a
traditional area of exclusive state concern).
318 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
319 See supra note 242.
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had any economic effects at all.320 Therefore, they would allow no
aggregation of effects, and they refused to consider the economic nature of
the regulated activities. It is possible that some members of the Supreme
Court—perhaps Justices Scalia and Thomas321—would adopt the
perspective of Judges Sentelle and Luttig, but we do not believe that a
majority of the Court would.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s statements in SWANCC concerning the
importance of identifying the “precise object or activity” having commercial
effects seem to indicate that he would favor the approach of the D.C. Circuit
in the arroyo toad case, where that court concentrated on the commercial
nature of the regulated activity, a planned large-scale residential
development.322 Yet the Chief Justice’s Lopez opinion sanctioned regulation
that is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.”323 Coupled with Justice Kennedy’s approval of statutes whose
“purposes” and “design” have a commercial nexus,324 we believe a majority
of the Court would be willing to sustain the ESA take provision as an
essential part of the ESA’s comprehensive economic regulatory scheme.
Affirming the ESA take provision on this ground would be ecologically
preferable to an affirmation on the grounds that either the listed species or
the regulated activity would have substantial effects on interstate
commerce. The former would largely be limited to megafauna, like red
wolves,325 while the latter would exempt small actors, the putative “hiker in
the woods or the homeowner landscaping his property.”326
Since the comprehensive scheme defense of the take provision is
grounded in the purposes and design of the statute, it seems likely to appeal
to Justice Kennedy. We think its prospects would be bolstered by linking the
comprehensive scheme rationale to the maintenance of biodiversity—which,
after all, is a purpose of the ESA327—and to the avoidance of the destructive
economic “race to the bottom” endorsed by both the Supreme Court and

320 NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1064–65 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Gibbs, 214 F.3d
483, 507–09 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., dissenting). The dissenters did not subscribe to the Fourth
and D.C. Circuits’ rulings that the scope of commercial or economic activity necessary to
sustain Commerce Clause regulation must be construed broadly. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491; GDF
Realty, 326 F.3d 622, 638 (5th Cir. 2003).
321 We can envision either justice echoing the sentiments of Judge Sentelle to the effect that
“[a]n ecosystem is an ecosystem, and commerce is commerce.” NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1065
(Sentelle, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas views the post-1937 expansion of Commerce Clause
power as inconsistent with the Court’s earlier precedent and the Framers’ intent, and wants to
revisit the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the last 65 years, see supra note 61, a proposition
with which Justice Kennedy clearly did not agree. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text
(endorsing stare decisis).
322 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167–68 (2001). See supra note 100; cf. supra notes 221–25 (D.C.
Circuit’s reasoning).
323 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
324 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
325 See supra text following note 250.
326 See supra note 262 and accompanying and following text.
327 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
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several circuits.328 We think the comprehensive scheme rationale could earn
five, or perhaps six, votes from the Court. Adoption of this rationale by the
Court would avert the perverse result of endangered species—which by
definition must be “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range”329—having so few members that they cannot
demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As Chief Judge
Wilkinson explained for the Fourth Circuit, such a result would mean that
“the more endangered the species, the less authority Congress has to
regulate the taking of it . . . because there are too few animals left to make a
commercial difference. [This result] would eviscerate the comprehensive
federal scheme for conserving endangered species and turn congressional
judgment on its head.”330
A less satisfactory ground for upholding the constitutionality of the
ESA’s take provision would be to focus on the commercial nature of the
regulated activity, the approach of the D.C. Circuit in the arroyo toad case as
well as Judge Henderson in the fly case.331 Upholding the take provision on
the basis of the commercial nature of the regulated activity would have
sound constitutional footing,332 but it would leave noncommercial activities
free to harm listed species.333 A still less satisfactory ground would be to
affirm the ESA’s take provision where listed species could show a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, as in the wolf case.334 Such a
result would limit ESA protection to megafauna, less than half of listed
species.335
We think defenders of the take provision should emphasize to the
Supreme Court the comprehensive scheme rationale which the Court so
recently endorsed,336 stressing the biodiversity protection evident in the
ESA’s ecosystem protection purpose,337 and the centrality of the take
provision to achieving that purpose. The defenders of the ESA should also
argue that without the ESA’s comprehensive scheme, the states would
engage in a destructive “race to the bottom” that would damage biodiversity
and environmental quality.338 If they do, our crystal ball predicts at least five
votes for upholding the constitutionality of the ESA’s take provision.

328

See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text.

329

16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000).

330

Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483, 498 (4th Cir. 2000).
Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 2003); NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C.

331

Cir. 1997) (Henderson, J., concurring).
332 See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553–60 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (discussing the history of
Commerce Clause interpretation); id. at 568–75 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the same
history).
333 See supra notes 258–62 and accompanying text.
334 See supra notes 246–50 and accompanying text.
335
336

Id.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

337

16 U.S.C § 1531(b) (2000).

338

See supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text.
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VI. EPILOGUE
While this Article was in press, two developments occurred just three
days apart which merit brief mention. First, on March 1, 2004 the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Rancho Viejo v. Norton.339 Second, three days
earlier on February 27, 2004, the Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiff-appellants
petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc in GDF Realty Investments, Ltd.
v. Norton, with 6 of its 16 active judges dissenting.340 Judge Edith Jones
wrote the dissent, agreeing with the panel’s analysis of Commerce Clause
precedent, but disagreeing both with its application of the comprehensive
scheme principle and the panel’s conclusion that species protection did not
constitute an invasion of traditional state land-use regulation.341
Regarding the former, the dissent asserted that the panel offered “little
reasoning” why the regulation of cave species was “an essential part of a
larger economic scheme.” 342 Judge Jones thought that the GDF Realty panel
“convert[ed] the ESA [into an economic regulatory scheme] by opining that
the majority of species takes would result from economic activity and ‘the
Cave Species takes would occur as a result of plaintiffs’ planned commercial
development’[,]”despite the fact the panel had earlier rejected the argument
that commerce connections could stem from the activity regulated.343 We
respectfully disagree. Initially, we note that Judge Jones has no generic
quarrel with the “comprehensive scheme” principle of commerce clause
jurisprudence since, in another context, she has approved the scheme
rationale to justify regulation of non-economic activity.344 Although the
activity regulated in this case was clearly a commercial development,345 this
339
340

124 S. Ct. 1506 (2004). For the previous case history of Rancho Viejo, see supra note 243.
GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, No. 01-51099, 2004 WL 396975 (5th Cir. Feb. 27,

2004).
341 Id. at *5. Judge Jones argued that 1) in the absence of direct connections to commerce
from the species “the panel attempts to convert the ESA to an economic regulatory statute by
opining that the majority of species takes would result from economic activity,” id. at *6, and 2)
that the holding would “trample” the federal-local distinction and “result in a significant
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use”. Id. at *7 (quoting
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001)).
342 Id. at *5.
343 Id. at *6 (quoting GDF Realty, 326 F.3d 622, 639 (5th Cir. 2003)).
344 Judge Jones has indicated that she recognizes the comprehensive scheme principle to
create the commercial nexus necessary to sustsain some commerce clause regulation of
otherwise non-economic activity. See United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1013–14 (5th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (Jones, J. dissenting) (distinguishing regulation of economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce from regulation of simple “activity” essential to
maintaining a larger scheme of interstate commerce regulation). Judge Jones explained that
“[a]mong the three elements of Lopez ’ s substantial effects test, the first and most critical is that
of characterization: whether § 922(o) fulfills the mission of regulating interstate commerce as
(1) a regulation of economic activity which, although itself local, has substantial effect on
interstate commerce, or (2) a regulation of activity which is essential to maintaining a larger,
interstate regime of economic regulation” and “[b]ecause we have concluded that mere
intrastate possession is neither economic activity nor an intrastate activity whose regulation is
essential to a larger commercial regulatory regime, § 922(o) cannot pass muster under the
Lopez substantial effects test.” Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
345 GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 169 F. Supp. 2d 648, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (noting
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happenstance was not the trigger that “convert[ed]” the Act into an
economic regulatory scheme. As evidenced by its text, legislative history,
and application, the ESA is a multi-purpose statute directed at, in the main,
activity “economic in nature.”346 In Justice Kennedy’s words, the ESA’s
“structure” and “design” fulfills commercial functions.347 We think it
significant that all three circuit court decisions to address the question—the
cave species, red wolf, and arroyo toad cases—concluded that the ESA was
unquestionably an economic regulatory scheme.348
As to Judge Jones’s latter argument, the Fourth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits
all maintained that the regulation of wildlife is a matter of national concern,
authority over which is shared with the states.349 Her dissent here, like Judge
Luttig in Gibbs,350 argued not for safeguarding an area of traditional
exclusive state concern but instead, as Chief Judge Wilkinson put it for the
Fourth Circuit, for the “dismember[ing]” of “long recognized federal”
power.351 We think that, if the Supreme Court chooses to review the cave
species case, it will side with Judge Wilkinson, not Judge Jones, since it has
recently reaffirmed the substantial federal role in wildlife regulation.352

the difficulty in finding “a more direct link to interstate commerce than a Wal-Mart”).
346 GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639 (citing text and legislative history of the ESA). For our
discussion and analysis see supra notes 16, 163–68, 197–203, 225, 263–270 and accompanying
text.
347 Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
348 See GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639; Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062, 1073–74 (2003); Gibbs, 214
F.3d 483, 497, 506 (4th Cir. 2000). See also supra notes 263–70.
349 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499; GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639; Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1078.
350 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 506–10 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
351 Id. at 505. For our discussion and analysis see supra notes 169–79, 198, 231–34, 275–82.
352 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999) (O’Connor,
J.) (“Although States have important interests in regulating wildlife and natural resources within
their borders, this authority is shared with the Federal Government when the Federal
Government exercises one of its enumerated constitutional powers.”). See generally MICHAEL J.
BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed. 1997).

